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Abstract
Elections differ not only between, but also within, countries. Some elections have
very simple voting rules and ballots. For instance, in the parliamentary elections in
Estonia or Germany, voters can select 1-out-of-n candidates. Other elections, like
parliamentary elections in Luxembourg and Belgium or local elections in Germany,
have very complex voting rules and huge ballots. These elections combine different
voting rules, namely select k-out-of-n, weight and rank candidates, and therefore
pose a challenge to both voters and electoral officials. Hence, in such elections
voters are likely to spoil their vote unintentionally, due to the complex voting rules.
In addition, the tallying process is very time intensive and likely to be error prone,
because of the combination of complex voting rules and huge ballots.
In order to address such challenges and improve the situation for both voters and
electoral officials, in particular with respect to the local elections in Hesse/Germany,
the EasyVote electronic voting scheme was proposed. EasyVote focuses on polling
station elections and its central idea is to use an electronic voting device that does
not store votes, but rather prints out a summary of voter’s selections on a DIN-A4
paper ballot (a paper audit trail). The ballot consists of a human- and a machine-
readable (a QR-Code) component. Further, electoral officials tally the ballots semi-
automatically by scanning the QR-Code of each ballot and verifying that its content
matches the human-readable component. However, before EasyVote can be used in
legally binding elections, various open research questions need to be addressed.
The goal of this dissertation is to pave the way for the use of EasyVote in legally
binding elections. To achieve this goal, this dissertation addresses five open re-
search questions, which are introduced below. While the second and fifth ques-
tion are EasyVote specific, the remaining ones are relevant to all electronic voting
schemes/systems that share similar concepts with EasyVote.
xvi Abstract
1. Are voters concerned about vote secrecy related to the use of QR-Codes and,
if so, how to address such concerns effectively?
2. What is an optimal ballot design that enables voters to understand the impact
of their selections and to verify their voting intention easily?
3. What are optimal verification instructions that make voters most likely to
verify that their ballot matches their intention?
4. What is an optimal verification setting that makes electoral officials most likely
to detect potential discrepancies between the human- and machine-readable
ballot components?
5. Are the vote casting and tallying processes usable and, if not, how to improve
their usability?
The findings indicate that voters do have secrecy concerns in association with the
use of QR-Codes. However, the findings suggest that the threat appraisal approach
of the protection motivation theory, is a viable approach to address and significantly
allay such concerns. Furthermore, the findings reveal that the ballot design, which
highlights the voter’s direct selections in orange, represents an optimal design for
voters to understand the impact of their selections and to verify their intention easily.
In addition, the findings show that just in time verification instructions, which are
pre-printed on the reverse of the ballot, have a significant effect on voters with respect
to verifying their ballot and detecting discrepancies. The findings also indicate a
significant increase with respect to detecting discrepancies when electoral officials
read voters’ direct selections out loud, while verifying that the human-readable ballot
component matches the associated QR-Code. Moreover, the findings suggest that
the implemented EasyVote prototype has a high perceived usability. In summary,
these findings reveal that EasyVote is likely to be recommended and that a malicious
or faulty behaviour of an electronic voting device, which might violate the integrity
of the election result, would be detected with very high probability.
Zusammenfassung
Wahlen unterscheiden sich nicht nur zwischen, sondern auch innerhalb einzelner
La¨nder. Einige Wahlen haben sehr einfache Abstimmungsregeln und Stimmzettel.
Bei Parlamentswahlen in Estland oder in Deutschland ko¨nnen Wa¨hler zum Beispiel
1-aus-n Kandidaten wa¨hlen. Andere Wahlen, wie die Parlamentswahlen in Lux-
emburg und Belgien oder die Kommunalwahlen in Deutschland, haben sehr kom-
plexe Abstimmungsregeln und große Stimmzettel. Da diese Wahlen verschiedene
Abstimmungsregeln kombinieren wie k-aus-n Kandidaten wa¨hlen (Panaschieren),
Stimmengewichtung (Kumulieren) und Vorzugswahl (den Rang der Kandidaten bee-
influssen), stellen diese Wahlen sowohl fu¨r Wa¨hler als auch fu¨r Wahlhelfer eine Her-
ausforderung dar. Aufgrund der komplexen Abstimmungsregeln ist es wahrschein-
lich, dass die Wa¨hler in solchen Wahlen unabsichtlich ungu¨ltige Stimmen abgeben.
Daru¨ber hinaus ist die Ausza¨hlung der abgegebenen Stimmen aufgrund der Kom-
bination von komplexen Abstimmungsregeln und den großen Stimmzetteln u¨beraus
zeitintensiv und mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit fehleranfa¨llig.
Um solchen Herausforderungen wirksam zu begegnen und die Situation sowohl fu¨r
Wa¨hler als auch fu¨r Wahlhelfer zu verbessern, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Kom-
munalwahlen in Hessen/Deutschland, wurde EasyVote als Konzept eines hybriden
(elektronisch/Papier) Wahlsystems vorgeschlagen. Der Fokus von EasyVote liegt auf
Wahlen im Wahlbezirk. Die zentrale Idee von EasyVote besteht in der Anwendung
eines elektronischen Abstimmungsgera¨ts, welches keine elektronischen Stimmen spe-
ichert, sondern eine Zusammenfassung der Stimmabgabe auf DIN-A4-Papier (einem
sogenannten “Paper Audit Trail”) ausdruckt. Der Ausdruck (Stimmzettel) besteht
sowohl aus einer menschlich lesbaren als auch einer maschinenlesbaren (QR-Code)
Komponente. Innerhalb des Ausza¨hlungsprozesses werden die Stimmzettel, d.h.
die abgegebenen Stimmen, halbautomatisch geza¨hlt. Dabei scannen Wahlhelfer den
QR-Code jedes einzelnen Stimmzettels ein und u¨berpru¨fen, ob dessen Inhalt mit dem
Inhalt der menschlich lesbaren Komponente u¨bereinstimmt. Bevor EasyVote jedoch
in rechtsverbindlichen Wahlen verwendet werden kann, mu¨ssen diverse Forschungs-
fragen adressiert werden.
xviii Abstract
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, den Weg fu¨r den Einsatz von EasyVote in
rechtsverbindlichen Wahlen zu ebnen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, befasst sich
diese Dissertation mit fu¨nf offenen Forschungsfragen, die im Folgenden vorgestellt
werden. Wa¨hrend die zweite und die fu¨nfte Frage EasyVote spezifisch sind, sind die
restlichen Fragen fu¨r alle Wahlsysteme relevant, welche auf a¨hnlichen Konzepten wie
EasyVote aufbauen.
1. Sind Wa¨hler u¨ber ihr Wahlgeheimnis in Zusammenhang mit der Verwen-
dung von QR-Codes besorgt und, wenn ja, wie ko¨nnen solche Sorgen effektiv
adressiert werden?
2. Wie sieht ein optimales Stimmzetteldesign aus, das den Wa¨hlern die Nachvol-
lziehbarkeit der Auswirkung und eine leichte U¨berpru¨fbarkeit ihrer Stimmab-
gabe ermo¨glicht?
3. Wie sehen optimale Anweisungen zur Stimmzettelu¨berpru¨fung aus, die ho¨chst-
wahrscheinlich sicherstellen, dass Wa¨hler u¨berpru¨fen, ob ihr Stimmzettel ihrer
Wahlintention entspricht?
4. Welche Methode zur Stimmzettelu¨berpru¨fung stellt am besten sicher, dass
Wahlhelfer mo¨gliche Diskrepanzen zwischen den menschlich- und maschinen-
lesbaren Stimmzettelkomponenten feststellen?
5. Sind die Prozesse der Stimmabgabe und Ausza¨hlung benutzbar und wenn
nicht, wie kann die Benutzbarkeit dieser Prozesse verbessert werden?
Die Ergebnisse zeigen Bedenken der Wa¨hler bezu¨glich ihres Wahlgeheimnisses in
Zusammenhang mit dem Einsatz von QR-Codes. Allerdings zeigen die Ergebnisse
auch, dass der Ansatz der Schutzmotivationstheorie zur Einscha¨tzung der Bedrohung
ein angemessener Ansatz ist, um solche Bedenken signifikant zu verringern. Daru¨ber
hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass ein optimales Stimmzetteldesign bezu¨glich der
Nachvollziehbarkeit und U¨berpru¨fbarkeit der Stimmabgabe erreicht werden kann,
indem die direkt vergebenen Stimmen in Orange hervorgehoben werden. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen auch, dass Anweisungen zur Stimmzettelu¨berpru¨fung, die auf der Ru¨ck-
seite des Stimmzettels vorgedruckt sind und den Wa¨hlern zum richtigen Zeitpunkt
gegeben werden, einen signifikanten Einfluss darauf haben, ob Wa¨hler ihren Stim-
mzettel u¨berpru¨fen und Diskrepanzen zu ihrer Wahlintention feststellen. Zusa¨tzlich
zeigen die Ergebnisse eine signifikante Steigerung der erfolgreichen Feststellung von
Diskrepanzen zwischen der menschlich lesbaren Stimmzettelkomponente und dem
xix
QR-Code, wenn Wahlhelfer wa¨hrend der Ausza¨hlung die direkt vergebenen Stim-
men laut vorlesen. Außerdem belegen die Ergebnisse eine hohe wahrgenommene Be-
nutzerfreundlichkeit des implementierten EasyVote Prototypen. Zusammenfassend
zeigen diese Ergebnisse, dass der Einsatz von EasyVote zu empfehlen ist, und dass
ein bo¨swilliges oder fehlerhaftes Verhalten eines Abstimmungsgera¨ts, welches die
Integrita¨t des Wahlergebnisses verletzen ko¨nnte, mit sehr hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit
festgestellt wird.
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1 Introduction
The saying different countries, different customs also holds true for elections. Elec-
tions can be very different between, and even within, countries. Some elections, like
parliamentary elections in Estonia or Germany have very simple voting rules and
ballots. In such elections voters can select 1-out-of-n candidates. Other elections,
like parliamentary elections in Luxembourg and Belgium or local elections in Ger-
many, have very complex voting rules and huge ballots. These elections combine
different voting rules, namely select k-out-of-n, weight and rank candidates, and
therefore pose a challenge to both voters and electoral officials. One very important
challenge is that voters are likely to spoil their vote unintentionally, due to the com-
plex voting rules. For instance, the number of invalid votes at the last local elections
in the city of Darmstadt (Hesse/Germany) in 2011 (5.5%1), was almost twice as high
compared to the last German federal elections in 2013 (on average 2.8%2). Another
important challenge is that the tallying process is very time intensive and likely to
be error prone, because of the combination of complex voting rules and huge ballots.
For instance, the last local elections in Darmstadt in 2011 took place on the 27th of
March and results were only published on April 63, even though the tallying process
is (partially) electronically supported, namely by the PC-Wahl4 software.
In order to address these challenges and improve the situation for both voters
and electoral officials, in particular with respect to the local elections in Hesse,
Volkamer et al. [VBD11] proposed the EasyVote electronic voting scheme. EasyVote,
which is examined in more detail in chapter 5, focuses on polling station elections
and can be briefly described as follows: In the vote casting process voters use an
electronic voting device to select their preferred candidates/parties. The device
supports voters regarding the validity of their selections. When voters confirm their
1http://www.statistik-hessen.de/K2011/EK1.htm, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
2http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/ergebnisse/
landesergebnisse/l06/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
3http://www.statistik-hessen.de/K2011/EG411000.pdf, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
4http://www.pcwahl.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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selections, a ballot, or so-called paper audit trail, is printed and no electronic data are
retained. The printed ballot contains a summary of voters’ selections and consists of
a human- and a machine-readable (a QR-Code as proposed in [Int15]) component.
Voters are supposed to verify that the human-readable ballot component reflects
their intention. Finally, voters exit the voting booth and deposit their ballot into
the ballot box. During the tallying process electoral officials tally the ballots semi-
automatically by scanning the QR-Codes. Electoral officials scan the QR-Code of
each ballot and are supposed to verify that its content matches the human-readable
ballot component. When electoral officials confirm that, the scanned ballot is added
to the intermediate result. Electoral officials repeat this process for all ballots. The
election result is computed after all ballots are tallied.
However, before EasyVote can be used in legally binding elections, various open
research questions need to be addressed. The goal of this dissertation is to pave the
way for the use of EasyVote in legally binding elections. To achieve this goal, we
identify, define and address five open research questions:
1. “Are voters concerned about vote secrecy related to the use of QR-Codes and,
if so, how to address such concerns effectively?”
This research question is motivated by the findings of Gerber et al. [GHDD13]
and Llewellyn et al. [LSX+13]. These findings reveal that voters might ab-
stain from the election [GHDD13] or alter their voting behaviour [LSX+13],
if they believe that the electronic voting system endangers their vote secrecy.
Further, Llewellyn et al. [LSX+13] reports that voters show doubts, i.e. have
secrecy concerns, when their ballot contains information additional to their
selections. Last, but not least, secrecy concerns regarding barcodes are also
mentioned in [NSN06]. We address this research question, which to the best
of our knowledge has not been addressed previously, in chapter 7.
2. “What is an optimal ballot design that enables voters to understand the impact
of their selections and to verify their voting intention easily?”
The motivation of this research question is twofold. One the one hand it is
driven by the challenge stated in the EasyVote proposal [VBD11], namely how
to design the ballot in such a way that it is understandable for the voters, i.e.
that voters understand the impact of their selections (how their cast votes
are tallied). On the other hand Henning et al. [HBV14] states that the mere
existence of the option to verify is not sufficient. It is also necessary that the
option to verify is made usable, i.e. that voters can verify their cast votes
easily. We address this research question, which to the best of our knowledge
has been only partially addressed by Jo¨ris [Jo¨r13], in chapter 8.
33. “What are optimal verification instructions that make voters most likely to
verify that their ballot matches their intention?”
Similar to other electronic voting schemes/systems that provide voters with
paper audit trails (printed ballots), for instance [BCH+12, BFL+12, Veg12,
BBE+13, Boa14, Vot08], EasyVote assumes that voters will verify that their
ballot matches their voting intention. However, various research studies, namely
[Sel04, Coh05, HNH+05, HNH+06a, mar06, SP06] have investigated this as-
sumption, and report that the number of voters that actually verify their
ballot is very low. We address this research question, which is motivated by
the results of previous studies, in chapter 9.
4. “What is an optimal verification setting that makes electoral officials most
likely to detect potential discrepancies between the human- and machine-
readable ballot components?”
While they tally the election results, electoral officials are required to ver-
ify that the human-readable ballot component matches the content stored
in and scanned from the QR-Code. Thereby, the accuracy of the tallying
process, i.e. election integrity, relies on human (electoral officials) attention.
However, studies from other research areas, such as airport baggage screen-
ing [WHK05, MM10] or cancer screening [GSR+04], report that human atten-
tion is notoriously unreliable. Hence, these results motivate our fourth research
question. We address this question, which to the best of our knowledge has
not been addressed previously, in chapter 10.
5. “Are the vote casting and tallying processes usable and, if not, how to improve
their usability?”
When a new electronic voting scheme/system is proposed, usually the research
focus is its security, for instance vote secrecy (the first research question), and
election integrity (the third and fourth research questions). Nevertheless, us-
ability represents another important aspect of electronic voting that we should
not ignore. Usability is as important as security, because to ensure election
integrity, voters must actually be able to cast their votes as intended. One
of the most discussed examples of the impact of poor usability on election
integrity, is the so-called butterfly ballot in the 2000 election in Florida. This
and many other unfortunate experiences of poor usability motivate our last
research question. We address this question in chapter 9 for the vote cast-
ing process and in chapter 10 for the tallying process. To the best of our
knowledge, this question has not been previously addressed in the context of
complex elections.
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While the second and fifth question are EasyVote specific, the remaining ones
are relevant to all electronic voting schemes/systems that share similar concepts
with EasyVote, like the Wombat voting system [BFL+12], the Belgian voting sys-
tem [Veg12], the STAR-Vote voting system [BBE+13], and the Vot.ar voting sys-
tem [Vot08]. Note that other research questions, like how to improve vote se-
crecy with respect to side-channel attacks (electromagnetic emissions [VE85], tem-
pest [Fri72] and differential power analysis [KJJ99]), or how EasyVote performs
with respect to technical [Vol09, SVB10, WBB+15] and legal [HVB12, SDNK+13,
BNSV14] evaluation approaches, are also important and necessary to address. How-
ever, they are out of the scope of this dissertation.
2 Related work
This chapter describes related work. We first introduce the methodology applied to
identify and determine related research. Afterwards, we describe and discuss related
research.
To identify and determine related research, we conducted a structured literature
search based on the approaches proposed by Brocke et al. [vBSN+09] and Webster
and Watson [WW02]. According to Brocke et al. [vBSN+09] a rigorous literature
search must be valid and reliable. The validity of our search process is based on the
following factors:
• Selected databases, keywords and inclusion and exclusion criteria.
• Covered period.
• Applied forward and backward search.
Further, reliability is based on the fully documented search process.
Databases: We searched through the following databases: ACM, DBLP, IEEEX-
Plore, ScienceDirect and SpringerLink.
Key words: We used the following keywords for our search: usable security, evalua-
tion, electronic voting,e-voting, paper audit trails, complex elections and com-
plicated elections.
Inclusion criteria: As electronic voting is a relatively young research area we chose
to not only focus on high-quality literature, as recommended in [vBSN+09]
and [WW02], but we also included journals, conferences and workshops that
are not highly rated in international rankings. Furthermore, as electronic
voting is also highly applied we included vendors’ systems.
Exclusion criteria: We decided to exclude non-academic publications, such as tech-
nical reports or white papers. We filtered out publications that were not
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written in English and those published before the year 2000. Furthermore, we
filtered out electronic voting schemes/systems that are not proposed for use
in polling station elections. Finally, we filtered out publications, which are
included in and considered as contributions of this dissertation.
Forward search: We used Google Scholar5 citation index service to perform a for-
ward search.
Backward search: In contrast to the forward search, the backward search was con-
ducted manually.
For the search we used key word combinations, which we classify under the fol-
lowing literature categories:
1. Usable security evaluation of electronic voting with paper audit trails in the
context of complex elections.
• usable security, evaluation, electronic voting, paper audit trails and com-
plex elections
• usable security, evaluation, electronic voting, paper audit trails and com-
plicated elections
• usable security, evaluation, e-voting, paper audit trails and complex elec-
tions
• usable security, evaluation, e-voting, paper audit trails and complicated
elections
2. Usable security evaluation of electronic voting with paper audit trails.
• usable security, evaluation, electronic voting and paper audit trails
• usable security, evaluation, e-voting and paper audit trails
3. Usable security evaluation of electronic voting.
• usable security, evaluation and electronic voting
• usable security evaluation and e-voting
4. Electronic voting in the context of complex elections.
• electronic voting and complex elections
• electronic voting and complicated elections
5https://scholar.google.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
7• e-voting and complex elections
• e-voting and complicated elections
We conducted a full-text search, and the databases were searched to identify
publications that contained at least one of the above combinations. In total, 2839
potentially relevant publications were identified. Afterwards, we applied the defined
inclusion and exclusion criteria, by manually screening publications based on title,
abstract and, if necessary, by skimming through the full text. Following this process
only 11 publications were determined to be relevant. Finally, we performed the
forward and backward search. As a result, 58 additional publications were identified
as relevant. Table 2.1 shows the number of publications for each journal, conference
or workshop that were identified as relevant.
In the following we discuss related research according to the categories defined in
the literature search. Note that for a more general overview with respect to usability
studies in the context of electronic voting (including Internet voting), we refer the
reader to [OV13].
Usable security evaluation of electronic voting with paper audit trails in the
context of complex elections
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has evaluated electronic voting
with paper audit trails in the context of complex elections from a usable security
perspective.
Usable security evaluation of electronic voting with paper audit trails
For this category we identified the following relevant publications: [Coh05, SP06,
GB07, GBG+08, JHG08, BKA15].
Similar to this dissertation, however in the context of simple elections, these pub-
lications, namely [Coh05, SP06], investigated whether voters act to verify that their
paper audit trail (ballot) matches their voting intention. In the study conducted by
Cohen [Coh05] participants were required to follow a voting agenda, i.e. to vote for
a pre-defined list of specific candidate(s) and/or a specific party. While instructions
regarding the use of the voting system were given in the voting booth, instruc-
tions regarding ballot verification were displayed on the final screen of the voting
device. The results revealed that only two out of 36 participants actually verified
and detected the deliberately, introduced manipulations: (1) Changing a vote to
a different candidate; (2) Removing a vote from a candidate; and (3) Removing a
complete contest. Furthermore, Selker and Pandolfo [SP06] report that only six out
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Table 2.1: Related work: Number of relevant publications per journal, conference and
workshop.
Count
Journal
Election Technology and Systems 4
Usability Studies 3
Information Forensics and Security 2
Student Journal of Public Policy Research 2
Social Science Computer Review 1
Midwest Political Science Association 1
American Politics Research 1
Electoral Studies 1
Human-Computer Studies 1
Electronic Governance 1
Information Technology & Politics 1
Political Behaviour 1
Interactions 1
Political Science Research and Methods 1
Information Design 1
Information Systems and Social Change 1
Conference
E-Voting and Identity 5
Electronic Voting 4
Human-Computer Interaction 2
E-Democracy and Open Government 2
Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction 1
Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance 1
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 1
IEEE Security & Privacy 1
Advances in Cryptology 1
Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction 1
Workshop
Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 13
Requirements Engineering for Electronic Voting Systems 2
Usability and Security of Electronic Voting System 1
Privacy in Electronic Society 1
e-Voting and e-Government in the UK 1
Others* 9
* Note that this category includes books, PhD and master theses,
and vendors’ electronic voting systems.
9of 35 participants actually verified and detected the manipulations on their ballot.
The manipulations were introduced deliberately and similar to those used by Co-
hen [Coh05]. In the study, participants were required to cast a vote in 13 contests.
While the list of candidates was pre-defined for nine of the contests, participants
could chose their preferred candidates in the remaining ones. Further, participants
were given verbal instructions with respect to ballot verification and the use of the
voting system outside the voting booth.
The rest of the publications focused on other aspects. For instance, Goggin et
al. [GB07] examined the speed and accuracy of hand recounts of paper audit trails.
In addition, Goggin et al. [GBG+08] compared the speed and accuracy of hand re-
counts of paper audit trails with respect to other auditing technologies, e.g. video
audit trails. Further, De Jong et al. [JHG08] examined voters’ perceptions of
vote secrecy and user-friendliness regarding paper audit trails. Finally, Belton et
al. [BKA15] examined the usability of two different ballot box configurations with
respect to reducing errors, which result from voters that fail to scan, or place, their
ballot into the ballot box.
Usable security evaluation of electronic voting
For this category we identified the following relevant publications: [CLP+06, HNH+06b,
SGH+06, Eve07, JHG07, BHMQ+08, EGB+08b, EGB+08a, Gre08, Gog08, HNH+08,
AKLM09, CEP09, CB09, CBL+09, OdB09, WBP+09, AKP11, KAC+11, SLC+11,
GMR+12, MGO12, AKP13, AILL13, Cam13, GDOS13, LSX+13, AKBW14, HCB15,
PLA+14, AKBW15, Lee15].
Similar to this dissertation, however in the context of simple elections and elec-
tronic voting without paper audit trails, these publications, namely [Eve07, CB09,
GMR+12, AKP13, GDOS13], investigated whether voters act to verify that the
review screen matches their voting intention. In the studies conducted by Ev-
erett [Eve07] two conditions were used: (1) Participants were required to follow a vot-
ing agenda, i.e. to vote for a pre-defined list of specific candidate(s) and/or a specific
party; and (2) Participants were required to make their own selections. Further, two
different manipulations, one in each study, were used: (1) Adding/removing contests
to/from the review screen; and (2) Vote flipping. Last, but not least, fictitious candi-
dates and parties were used. The results revealed that more than 60% of the partic-
ipants in each study (66 participants in the first, and 101 in the second study), inde-
pendent of the condition, did not notice (on the review screen) that their selections
were altered. All the other studies, namely [CB09, GMR+12, AKP13, GDOS13]
are replications of, and motivated by, the studies conducted by Everett [Eve07].
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However, Acemyan et al. [AKP13] used real candidates/parties and required partic-
ipant to cast a vote for issues of personal relevance. Furthermore, except Gilbert et
al. [GDOS13], all studies report similar results to Everett [Eve07], i.e. a very low
number of participants who noticed (on the review screen) that their selections were
altered. Gilbert et al. [GDOS13] report a detection rate of 90%, even without in-
forming participants on the importance of verifying the review screen. Even though
the results reported by Gilbert et al. [GDOS13] seem very promising, they are not
significant with respect to ensuring the integrity of cast votes or election result. A
malicious or faulty electronic device, which does not provide an independent verifi-
cation mechanism for cast votes, e.g. paper audit trails, can alter voters’ selections
without being detected, while still showing voters their unaltered selections on the
review screen.
The rest of the publications focused on other aspects, such as the usability eval-
uation of different electronic voting technologies [CLP+06, HNH+06b, SGH+06,
JHG07, BHMQ+08, Gog08, HNH+08, CEP09, CBL+09, OdB09, WBP+09, KAC+11,
SLC+11, MGO12, Cam13, AKBW14, HCB15, AKBW15, Lee15], the comparison be-
tween different electronic voting technologies and traditional voting methods (paper-
based elections) [EGB+08b, EGB+08a, Gre08], or the implications and effect of vot-
ers’ trust [AKLM09, AKP11, AILL13, PLA+14] and understanding [LSX+13] on the
adoption of electronic voting.
Electronic voting in the context of complex elections
For this category we identified the following relevant publications, namely the Digital
Voting Pen [AMBS07], EasyVote [VBD11] and the Belgian voting system [Veg12].
These publications propose electronic voting schemes/systems that are designed
for complex elections, similar to the local elections in the city of Darmstadt, see
section 4. In the following we outline the differences between these proposals.
For an overview regarding EasyVote [VBD11], we refer the reader to chapter 5.
In contrast to EasyVote, when using the Digital Voting Pen [AMBS07], voters cast
their vote on a paper ballot by using a pen. Both the pen and the ballot are based
on the Anoto Technology6. After selecting the preferred candidates and/or parties,
voters exit the voting booth, and stick their pen into a docking station to register
their electronic vote. When the vote is registered, voters deposit their paper ballot
into the ballot box. Furthermore, the election results is computed by using the
electronic registered votes, while the marked paper ballots can be used for random
audits. Note that the main advantage of the Digital Voting Pen is that the vote
6http://www.anoto.com/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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casting process remains almost unchanged as compared to the traditional paper-
based elections. However, in the context of complex elections, this is rather the
main disadvantage, because voters are not given any feedback with respect to the
validity of their cast vote.
In contrast to EasyVote, when using the Belgian voting system [Veg12], voters
enable the voting device in the voting booth by using a token (smartcard). Similar to
EasyVote, after selecting the preferred candidates and/or parties, the voting device
prints a ballot. The printed ballot, as in EasyVote, consists of a human- and a
machine-readable (a QR-Code) component. However, as opposed to EasyVote, the
QR-Code encodes the encryption of the voters’ selections. Afterwards, voters exit
the voting booth, scan the QR-Code to register their electronic vote, and deposit
their ballot into the ballot box. Furthermore, the election result is computed by using
the electronic registered votes, while the printed ballots can be used for random
audits. The Belgian voting system and EasyVote are very similar, however the
Belgian voting systems has two disadvantages: (1) QR-Codes are unique. This,
in contrast to EasyVote, facilitates well-know attacks, like vote buying and voter
coercion [JCJ05]; and (2) Tokens are used to enable the voting device. This, as
opposed to EasyVote, facilitates well-known attacks, like chain voting [Jon05], or
might cause confusion and long queues at the polling stations, in case voters lose
their tokens.

Part I.
Fundamentals

3 Usable security
The research questions, which are addressed in this dissertation and listed below,
combine human factors (usability) and technical aspects (security) in the context of
electronic voting. By following a human-centred security approach, these questions
aim to align usability and security. Thus, these questions can be considered as
usable security research questions in the context of electronic voting. Therefore,
in the first part of this chapter we provide a brief overview of usable security in
general. For more detailed information regarding usable security we refer the reader
to [Yee04, PE08, Kas14]. In the second part we emphasise the importance of usable
security in the context of electronic voting and introduce a standard methodology
for assessing usability.
1. Are voters concerned about vote secrecy related to the use of QR-Codes and,
if so, how to address such concerns effectively?
2. What is an optimal ballot design that enables voters to understand the impact
of their selections and to verify their voting intention easily?
3. What are optimal verification instructions that make voters most likely to
verify that their ballot matches their intention?
4. What is an optimal verifiability setting that makes electoral officials most likely
to detect potential discrepancies between the human- and machine-readable
ballot components?
5. Are the vote casting and tallying processes usable and, if not, how to improve
their usability?
3.1. General overview
In 1975, Jerome Saltzer and Michale Schroeder [SS75] were the first to acknowledge
the importance and impact of usability regarding the security and acceptance of
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human-computer interactive systems. Nevertheless, usability has played a limited
role in the development of secure systems and security research, because security ex-
perts either did not acknowledge its importance or lacked the expertise to consider
and address potential usability issues [CG05]. For instance, the famous hacker,
Kevin Mitnick, revealed that ’...it was easier to dupe people into revealing their
password by employing various social engineering techniques, rather than to crack
the password.’ [SF05]. Usually, such security failures are attributed to users’ negli-
gence and lack of education, while the term “stupid user” was often used, typically
muttered sotto voce, by security experts [VR13].
Fortunately, longer than a decade, the research community has agreed that, for a
system to be secure, it must be usable, i.e. we need to design secure systems that
people can actually use. Ever since, the usable security community has done a lot
to align usability and security, for instance by developing user interfaces for raising
security awareness [SMN+13] or for effective anti-phishing software [GHJV94], or
implementing Android apps [Bur09] that aim to educate users to spot phishing
URLs [CVBB14, CVB+15].
While user authentication is one of the oldest and most researched topics in usable
security [Swa12], other researchers have proposed guidelines on how to design secure
and usable interactive systems [CG05, HA14], and how to integrate usability into
the requirements and design process [FMS07]. Consequently, nowadays usability
and security go hand in hand [CB14].
3.2. Usable security in electronic voting
The necessity to align usability and security also holds true for electronic voting. In
the context of electronic voting, usability plays a key role with respect to security,
namely election integrity. Election integrity can be ensured only if voters are able to
cast their vote, and verify that their vote has been cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast
and tallied-as-stored.7 In particular, in the context of electronic voting with paper
audit trails, where voters play a key role in ensuring election integrity, usability
becomes even more crucial, because ’...security is only as good as it’s weakest link,
and people are the weakest link in the chain.’ [Sch00]. One of the most famous
real world examples, which revealed the importance and impact of usability on
election integrity, is the so-called butterfly ballot in the 2000 election in Florida.
The positioning of candidates and arrows caused a significant decrease in usability.
This led many voters to make a selection other than their intended one. While the
7Refer to [OBV13] for the definition of verifiability in the context of electronic voting.
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election in Florida is the most well-known example, there are many cases, refer to
Norden et al. [NKQC08], where usability issues are likely to have influenced the
outcome of an election, i.e. violated election integrity (the security of the system).
In addition, poor usability, i.e. if voters have to wait in long queues or if they are
concerned regarding the use of the system [THhP+05], can decrease voter turnout
significantly. Hence, when considering electronic voting, usability represents a key
aspect that we should not ignore. Therefore in the following, we introduce a standard
methodology for assessing usability in the context of electronic voting. Note that
we use this methodology throughout the studies reported in this dissertation.
Assessing usability in electronic voting
To assess usability in the context of electronic voting, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends the use of the ISO 9241-11 stan-
dard [Int98]. According to ISO 9241-11, usability comprises the following three
components that should be defined with respect to the context of use:
• Effectiveness (the ability of users to complete their task).
• Efficiency (the extent to which users consume resources to perform their
task).
• Satisfaction (the level of satisfaction users experience in performing their
task).

4 Complex elections:
Local elections in Darmstadt
In this dissertation we focus on complex elections, namely the local elections in
the city of Darmstadt, Hesse, Germany. The local elections in Darmstadt, similar
to parliamentary elections in Luxembourg and Belgium, have very complex voting
rules and huge ballots which challenge both voters and electoral officials. In these
elections voters are likely to spoil their vote unintentionally. For instance, the num-
ber of invalid votes at the last local elections in Darmstadt in 2011 (5.5%8), was
almost twice as high as at the last German federal elections in 2013 (on average
2.8%9). Furthermore, the tallying process is very time intensive and likely to be
error prone, because of the combination of complex voting rules and huge ballots.
For instance, the last local elections in Darmstadt in 2011 took place on the 27th
of March and results were only published on April 610, even though the tallying
process is (partially) electronically supported, namely by the PC-Wahl11 software.
In order to improve this situation, Volkamer et al. [VBD11] proposed the EasyVote
electronic voting scheme. EasyVote aims to address these challenges by supporting
voters and electoral officials electronically, and at the same time by maintaining the
vote casting and tallying process of the local elections in Darmstadt. Therefore,
in this chapter we introduce and describe the steps12 of these processes, which are
adhered to the user studies reported in this dissertation. For that, we use the
2011 elections in Darmstadt as exemplary. Note that the vote casting and tallying
8http://www.statistik-hessen.de/K2011/EK1.htm, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
9http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/ergebnisse/
landesergebnisse/l06/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
10http://www.statistik-hessen.de/K2011/EG411000.pdf, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
11http://www.pcwahl.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
12The exact steps and their respective rules of action can be found in more detail
here, https://www.darmstadt.de/fileadmin/Bilder-Rubriken/Rathaus/Politik/wahlen/
PDF-Dateien/Kommunalwahlen/Leitfaden_fuer_Wahlvorstaende.pdf, last accessed Febru-
ary, 7, 2016.
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process are publicly open. This means that the general public (eligible voters, private
individuals, nongovernmental organisations, media etc.) is allowed to observe and
thereby verify the correctness of these processes. Nevertheless, to fulfil the principles
of free and secret elections, the public observation is restricted, meaning that voters
cast their vote secretly in the voting booth.
4.1. Vote casting process
Currently eligible voters receive an election notification. The notification informs
them regarding their registration in the electoral register of the assigned polling
station, and also serves as proof of identity. Hence, to participate in the election,
i.e. to cast their vote, voters visit the polling station they are assigned to. Next,
voters identify themselves to the electoral officials. To identify, voters either submit
the election notification or use an official identification document, such as driver’s
license, passport or identity card. Note that according to the Federal Election
Code the submission of the election notification or the identification document is
not always necessary. For instance in case of personal acquaintance between voters
and electoral officials it is not needed. When electoral officials confirm the voters’
identity, voters are given a blank ballot and enter the voting booth. To cast their
vote, voters use an ordinary pen to select (mark) their preferred candidates/parties.
After voters have made their selections, they fold their ballot, exit the voting booth
and deposit their ballot into the ballot box. Note that if voters want to change their
selections, more specifically to not only correct them, they are required to proceed
as follows:
1. Exit the voting booth.
2. Destroy the used ballot in front of the electoral officials, while keeping their
selections secret.
3. Get a new blank ballot and reenter the voting booth.
Furthermore, in the vote casting process, voters are restricted by the following
voting rules that are also printed on the top of the ballot:
• Voters can cast 7113 direct votes.
• Voters can assign up to three votes to each candidate (cumulative voting).
13This number depends on the number of available seats, which also limits the number of candidates
nominated by a party. The number of available seats depends on the size of the district.
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• Voters can cast votes to candidates of different parties (vote splitting).
• Voters can select a party (mark a party header).
• Voters can cross out candidates.
If voters select a party, the remaining votes which are not cast directly are as-
signed to the candidates of the selected party according to the party’s list order,
automatically. By being able to cross out candidates voters can influence the au-
tomatic assignment of votes when a party is selected. Note that practically, the
automatic assignment of votes takes place in the tallying process, in which electoral
officials evaluate voters’ selections. Hence, in the vote casting process voters can not
have any certainty of the final allocation.
In addition, depending on the size of the district more than ten parties and more
than 450 candidates are nominated for the elections, which results in huge ballots.
The ballot of the local elections in Darmstadt, presented in Figure 4.1, consists of
two components:
Figure 4.1: Complex elections: The ballot of the local elections in Darmstadt in 2011
(Size: 27” x 35”).
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1. The component on the top of the ballot. This component contains the de-
scription of the election, i.e. the election for which the ballot is cast, and the
voting rules.
2. The component, which contains the nominated candidates and parties for the
respective election. While the order of candidates is determined by the party,
the order of parties is determined according to the results of the last election.
Thus, in the last election the CDU party got the most votes, and therefore is
listed on the first place.
Since the combination of complex voting rules and huge ballots undoubtedly leads
to errors, so-called healing rules are applied during the tallying process:
• If a voter casts more than 3 direct votes to a candidate, only three votes are
tallied.
• If a voter casts more than 71 direct votes for the candidates of one party, only
71 votes are tallied.
• If a voter selects more than one party and casts fewer than, or equal to, 71
direct votes, only the direct votes are tallied.
These healing rules aim to validate a ballot which might be interpreted as invalid
according to the strict letter of the voting rules.
4.2. Tallying process
The tallying process consists of two phases carried out by the electoral officials. The
first phase of the tallying process, which starts at the end of the election day and is
monitored by an electoral officer, takes place in the respective polling stations. The
electoral officials (approximately 9 volunteers) are required to perform the following
sequential steps:
1. Open the ballot boxes and ensure that the number of cast ballots matches the
number of voters marked off in the electoral register. If there is no match,
electoral officials have to try to clarify the difference. This might require to
repeat the entire count. If the error (mismatch) can not be determined, this
is to be explained in the respective transcript record.
2. Classify ballots into four categories:
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(1) Only a party is selected.
(2) Candidates are directly selected (and a party is selected).
(3) Invalid.
(4) Cannot be obviously assigned to any of the other categories.
3. Verify that ballots are correctly classified.
4. Manually tally the ballots of category (1) according to the selected party.
5. Review ballots of category (4) and assign them to the respective category (1,
2 or 3).
6. Compute the intermediate result manually, by considering only the ballots of
category (1 and 3), including those from the fifth step.
7. Communicate by phone the intermediate result to the corresponding electoral
registration office.
8. Fill in and sign the election transcript record.
The second phase, which starts the day after the election, takes place in publicly
accessible offices of the respective municipality. In this phase, during which the
ballots of category (2) are tallied, electoral officials are electronically supported by
a tallying software, namely the PC-Wahl14. Figure 4.2 shows the PC-Wahl interface
for entering the ballots (votes). Nevertheless, before this phase starts the electoral
officer enters the intermediate result from the first phase into the PC-Wahl. Note
that in practice the correctness of this step could be, but it is not, verified because
the electoral officer is considered trustworthy.
In the second phase electoral officials (three municipality employees) have to per-
form the following sequential steps:
1. Enter the votes (voter’s selections) of the first five ballots into PC-Wahl.
2. Manually tally the first five ballots.
3. Verify that the outcome of the 2nd and 3rd steps match.15
4. Enter the votes from the remaining ballots into PC-Wahl.
14http://www.pcwahl.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
15The PC-Wahl software is assumed to be trustworthy. Thus, this step serves as a self-control for
the electoral officials.
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Figure 4.2: Complex elections: The interface of the PC-Wahl software for entering the
votes.
5. Compute, with PC-Wahl, the final election result.
6. Sign the printed disposition.
The process of entering the votes into PC-Wahl is performed by three electoral
officials. The first electoral official narrates the voter’s selections on the ballot, the
second enters them into the PC-Wahl, and the third observes and thereby verifies
the correctness of this process. Note that for auditing purposes, electoral officials
label (mark with an ordinary pen) ballots consecutively with the respective number
of their digital representation (PC-Wahl entry).
Electoral officials who participate in the second phase are employees of the corre-
sponding municipality and therefore are considered to be technically skilled. They
participate in an introductory workshop regarding the PC-Wahl software. During
the workshop, which usually lasts about 30 minutes, the electoral officials have the
opportunity to try out the PC-Wahl software.
5 EasyVote
In this chapter we introduce EasyVote [VBD11], an hybrid (electronic/paper) voting
scheme. In the first part of this chapter we outline the main goal and the general
concept, focusing on the vote casting and tallying process, of EasyVote. In the
second part we present the EasyVote prototype, which is used and incrementally
improved in the user studies reported in this dissertation. Thereby, we focus on the
ballot design and the interfaces for the vote casting and tallying process.
5.1. General concept
Complex elections, i.e. elections with complex voting rules and huge ballots, chal-
lenge both voters and electoral officials. Among many challenges, there are two very
important ones:
• Voters are likely to spoil their vote unintentionally.
• The tallying process is very time intensive and likely to be error prone.
The main goal of EasyVote, which focuses on the complex local elections in Darm-
stadt, is to address the above challenges by supporting voters and electoral officials
electronically. Thereby, however, by preserving the rough, publicly open, processes
(vote casting and tallying) of the traditional paper-based elections. Hence, the cen-
tral idea of EasyVote is to use an electronic voting device, which supports voters with
interactive feedback while selecting their preferred candidates/parties and prints the
summary of their selections on a DIN-A4 [Int07] piece of paper. The printed bal-
lot or so-called paper audit trail, which contains the summary of voter’s selections,
consists of a human- and a machine-readable (a QR-Code as proposed in [Int15])
component. Voters are supposed to verify that the human-readable ballot compo-
nent reflects their voting intention and then to deposit their ballot into the ballot
box. Similarly, electoral officials are supported by an electronic tallying device,
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which enables them to tally the ballots semi-automatically by scanning the QR-
Codes. Thus, to compute the election result, electoral officials scan the QR-Code
of each ballot and supposedly verify that its content matches the human-readable
ballot component.
The advantages of EasyVote, in comparison to the traditional paper-based elec-
tions, can be summarised as follows:
• Voters do not spoil their vote (ballot) unintentionally . Note that EasyVote
does not (fully) restrict voters in their selections. For instance, voters are able
to invalidate their ballot intentionally, either directly (e.g. selecting the button
spoil ballot) or indirectly (e.g. printing a blank ballot). Nevertheless, there
are two restrictions regarding the act of voting: (1) Voters can not cast more
than three direct votes to a candidate; (2) An indirectly invalidated ballot, for
instance when a voter casts more than 71 votes among candidates of different
parties, does not contain all selections due to the restricted ballot size, but
rather a textual explanation regarding the invalidity of the ballot.
• Voters do better and directly understand the impact of their selections, because
the so-called healing rules are applied immediately, i.e. not in the tallying
phase.
• Visually impaired voters are able to cast their vote without assistance.
• Electoral officials might make fewer errors, as voter’s selections are automati-
cally, rather than manually, transferred into the tallying device.
• Electoral officials and the general public are able to verify intermediate results.
• Electoral officials might compute the election results faster, i.e. on the election
day, due to smaller ballot sizes. The smaller size of the ballots might also
improve the accuracy of the process.
• Fewer personnel are necessary, because EasyVote suggest that only two elec-
toral officials are required to perform the tallying process.
Next to the above advantages, EasyVote introduces a number of new challenges
that need to be considered and addressed. Some of these challenges, for instance
the development of effective verification instructions that make voters most likely to
verify that their ballot matches their intention, are addressed within this disserta-
tion. However, others, for instance how to ensure vote secrecy against side-channel
attacks, are out of the scope of this dissertation.
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While Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present the EasyVote components, in the following we
describe the EasyVote steps of the vote casting and tallying process. Note that for
the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one electronic voting device in
the polling station. Nevertheless, in practice, depending on the size of the district,
polling stations might be equipped with many electronic voting devices, including
backups. Furthermore, for procedures that are out of the scope of this dissertation,
like filling printouts, changing cartridges or dealing with complaints, we refer the
reader to [BJV14].
Figure 5.1: EasyVote: The components
used in the vote casting process.
Figure 5.2: EasyVote: The components
used in the tallying process.
5.1.1. Vote casting process
As EasyVote aims to maintain the processes of the traditional paper-based elections,
voters proceed similar to the local elections in Darmstadt regarding identification,
see section 4.1.
After electoral officials confirm the voter’s identity, they enable the electronic
voting device by using a remote wired controller. Next, the voter enters the voting
booth. In the voting booth, the voter prepares the ballot by selecting the preferred
candidates/parties on the voting device. The voting device supports the voter by
giving feedback about the current state of the ballot, specifically whether it is valid or
not. When the voter confirms her selections, which are shown on the review screen,
the voting device prints the ballot. After printing, the voting device is disabled
automatically and no electronic data are retained. The printed ballot contains the
voter’s selections, as shown before on the review screen, in a human- and a machine-
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readable (a QR-Code) format. The voter is supposed to verify that the human-
readable ballot component reflects her voting intention. Finally, the voter folds the
printed ballot, exits the voting booth and deposits the ballot into the ballot box. In
case the voter wants to cast a different ballot, i.e. not the one already printed, she
is required to proceed as follows:
1. Exit the voting booth.
2. Destroy the printed ballot in front of the electoral officials, while keeping her
selections secret.
3. Wait until electoral officials re-enable the voting device, and then reenter the
voting booth.
5.1.2. Tallying process
The EasyVote tallying process, similarly to the vote casting process, is based on the
tallying process of the local elections in Darmstadt, see section 4.2. In the follow-
ing we describe only the second phase, because the first phase and the respective
preparatory steps, for instance entering intermediate results, are completely main-
tained from the traditional paper-based elections.
Similar to the process with PC-Wahl, electoral officials tally ballots individually.
Thereby, electoral officials scan the QR-Code and are supposed to ensure that its
content, as shown on the first monitor, matches the human-readable ballot com-
ponent. In case there is a mismatch, electoral officials are supposed to undertake
respective corrections, such that the digital representation of the ballot (EasyVote
entry) matches the printed one. The corrected, printed ballots are placed on a sep-
arate batch for later auditing. After electoral officials have verified (when necessary
corrected) the content, and confirmed its correctness, the scanned ballot is added
to the intermediate result, shown on the second monitor. Further, electoral officials
are supposed to verify that the scanned ballot is added to the intermediate result
correctly. Afterwards, for auditing purposes, electoral officials label (mark with an
ordinary pen) ballots consecutively with the respective number of their digital repre-
sentation (EasyVote entry). When all ballots are tallied/scanned, electoral officials
compute the final election result by printing and signing the disposition.
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5.2. Prototype
This section introduces the EasyVote prototype. This prototype, which is used
and incrementally improved throughout this dissertation, is the result of the master
thesis by Jo¨ris [Jo¨r13]. The goal of this prototype is to enable researchers to explore
research questions regarding electronic voting in the context of complex elections.
Thus, even though this prototype is based on well-known software design patterns
(model-view-controller, observable, singleton, composite etc.) [GHJV94] and it does
not store ballots electronically, we do not recommend the use of this prototype in
legally binding elections. This prototype should be considered a tool to conduct
research rather than a system to conduct (legally binding) elections. However, we
encourage other researchers who are interested in electronic voting and complex
elections to use and further improve the EasyVote prototype.
In the following we introduce and describe the different components of the EasyVote
ballot. Further, we present and describe the different components of the interfaces
for the vote casting and tallying process.
5.2.1. Ballot design
In this section we introduce and describe the components of the EasyVote ballot
design, which is proposed in [Jo¨r13] and presented in Figure 5.3. The ballot consists
of three main components:
1. The component on the top of the ballot. This component contains the de-
scription of the election, i.e. the election for which the ballot is cast.
2. The middle component which consists of the following three sub-components:
a) The left sub-component, which contains the name or abbreviation of the
selected party.
b) The middle sub-component or so-called status bar. This component con-
tains a textual explanation regarding the ballot composition, i.e. how
the voter has cast her votes. This explanation shall enable voters and
electoral officials to comprehend the consequences of the voter’s actions
(selections), and thereby prevent the role of the electronic voting device
as a decision maker. For instance, due to the many possibilities to invali-
date a ballot and the ballot’s size restriction, all invalid ballots share the
same look. Thus, the left sub-component contains the word invalid, and
the middle sub-component explains in text, why the electronic device has
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interpreted a voter’s selections as invalid. This enables both voters and
electoral officials to comprehend the consequences of the voter’s actions
(selections).
c) The right sub-component contains the QR-Code. The QR-Code, which
encodes the same information as the human-readable ballot component,
serves to tally the ballots semi-automatically. Note that the QR-Code
encodes the information in plaintext. This means that the encoded in-
formation can be read and interpreted with any QR-Code reader.
Figure 5.3: EasyVote: The ballot design and components.
3. The bottom component which consists of three columns. While the middle
column contains the crossed out candidates, the left and right columns contain
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the selected candidates, i.e. candidates that are assigned votes, either directly
or automatically by selecting a party. Note that due to size restrictions the
middle column contains only the crossed out candidates of the selected party.
Note that in contrast to the interfaces, which are presented in the next section, no
usability methods have been applied to evaluate the proposal, shown in Figure 5.3.
5.2.2. Interfaces
In this section we introduce and describe the components of the interfaces for the
vote casting and tallying process. The interfaces of the vote casting and tallying
process have been designed based on The Low Error Voting Interface [SHGS05] and
the following interface design recommendations by Tidwell [Tid10]:
1. The interfaces provide clear entry points, i.e. the interfaces determine a clear
starting point and accompany the user (voter and/or electoral official) in the
subsequent steps by providing all information necessary to proceed.
2. The interfaces are safe to explore, i.e. users are able to undo every single step
and also start from the beginning16, without worrying about the consequences
of their previous action(s).
3. The interfaces facilitate recognition, because all interfaces share the same font,
font size, colour, and positioning of buttons and information panels. Note that
these attributes are different between the vote casting and tallying process
interfaces.
4. The interfaces follow the few hues, many values design pattern. This means
that the interfaces consist of one basic colour which is used in various colour
shades and supplemented only by signal colours, namely red, green and or-
ange. Note that the basic colours, namely blue for the vote casting and gray
for tallying process interfaces, are selected based on the system neutrality re-
quirement [Ric12]. This requirement states that any content-related influence
of voters by the voting system should be excluded, for instance colours that
are socially associated with nominated parties.
Furthermore, the interfaces have been iteratively improved by applying a us-
ability method, namely the cognitive walkthrough method proposed by Stone et
16This is possible as long as voters do not start the printing process.
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al. [SJWM06]. Thereby, information security, cryptography, electronic voting, us-
ability, human computer interaction, legal, election administration and design ex-
perts inspected the interfaces by going through various fictitious voting scenarios.
The goal of applying the cognitive walkthrough was to analyse and improve the
functionality and information provided to voters and electoral officials in each step.
This is so that they can make an informed decision regarding which functionality to
use, and understand the corresponding next step.
Interfaces for the vote casting process
The interfaces for the vote casting process, presented in Figure 5.4, consist of four
main components:
Figure 5.4: EasyVote: Components of the vote casting process interfaces.
1. The component on the top of the interface which has two functionalities:
a) It informs voters regarding the number of already cast votes and the
remaining ones. Further, the presented information distinguishes between
votes that are cast directly and votes that are assigned automatically, if
the voter has selected a party.
b) It informs voters regarding the current state of their selections, specifically
whether the ballot is valid or not. This information is supported by
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using different colours: (1) Blue for neutral (vote casting not started);
(2) Green for valid; (3) Red for invalid; and (4) Orange when a healing
rule is applied. Note that the information regarding the applied healing
rule, or why the ballot is invalid, is also printed on the status bar (middle
sub-component) of the ballot, refer to section 5.2.1.
2. The left column component which consists of two parts. While the upper part
contains the list of nominated parties (as buttons), the bottom part contains
the control and navigation buttons.
3. The middle component, which displays the candidates of the clicked party. In
this component the voter can cast direct votes, cross-out candidates or select
the clicked party.
4. The right column component which consists of two parts. While the upper
part contains the search function and general information on how to proceed,
the bottom part contains the legend regarding the different symbols.
Note that these components are shared among all interfaces for the vote cast-
ing process. The different interfaces for the vote casting process are presented in
section A in appendix.
Interfaces for the tallying process
The interfaces for the tallying process build upon the recommendations in [VBD11]
(the original EasyVote publication), namely to use two different interfaces that are
displayed on two different monitors simultaneously. The first interface, presented in
Figure 5.5, consists of the following components:
1. The left column component which contains the control and navigation buttons.
2. The middle component which is a blank space. On this component electoral of-
ficials shall hold the currently scanned ballot and compare whether its content
matches the displayed data.
3. The left and right columns, next to the middle component. This component,
which displays the data scanned from the QR-Code, enables electoral officials
to perform a column-wise comparison with the printed ballot. In addition,
the left column displays the selected party and the sequential number (ID) of
the currently scanned ballot. Further, the right column displays whether the
ballot is valid (green) or invalid (red).
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Figure 5.5: EasyVote: Scanning and verifying the content of the current ballot.
The second interface, presented in Figure 5.6, consist of the following components:
Figure 5.6: EasyVote: Verifying the correctness of the intermediate result.
1. The component on the top of the interface. This component contains the
sequential number (ID) of the currently scanned ballot, the number of all
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scanned ballots, the number of valid and invalid ballots and the name of the
electoral officer.
2. The bottom component which contains the current intermediate result, i.e. the
total number of votes per candidate. The candidates are ordered according
to the paper-based elections, i.e. according to their party list order and to
the order of parties on the paper ballot. Furthermore, in order to support the
verification of intermediate results, the candidates that are assigned votes after
scanning the current ballot are highlighted. Note that due to size restrictions,
i.e. size of the monitor, the candidates are listed/represented only by their
election specific number.

Part II.
User studies

6 Background
In this chapter we introduce background information with respect to the user studies
reported in this dissertation. The first part provides a short overview regarding the
used research methods. In the second part we introduce some additional considera-
tions that are shared among the reported studies.
6.1. Research methods
In this section we introduce the different types of behavioural research and discuss
how to determine the design structure of an experiment. Further, we outline the
various types of experimental design and statistical tests.
Types of behavioural research
A variety of research method are available for conducting research in the area of
human-computer interaction (HCI), which includes the area of usable security. The
most frequently used are observations, field studies, surveys, usability studies, in-
terviews, focus groups, and controlled experiments. All of these methods are kinds
of behavioural research (empirical investigations) and can be categorised into three
groups: descriptive, relational and experimental. Descriptive investigations, for
instance observations and surveys, aim to construct an accurate description of a
situation or a set of events. However, this method does not enable the researcher
to identify a relationship between observed events, nor to provide an explanation.
In contrast, relational investigations allow the establishment of relations between
multiple factors, for instance the value of factor X changes as the value of factor
Y changes. However, in contrast to experimental investigations, this method can
rarely determine the casual relationship between factors. Hence, experimental re-
search enables the identification of causal relationships. Table 6.1 summarises the
differences between these types of behavioural research. For more detailed informa-
tion regarding research methods in HCI, we refer the reader to [LFH10].
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Table 6.1: Research methods: Differences between descriptive, relational and experimen-
tal research [LFH10].
Types
of research
Focus General claims Typical
methods
Descriptive Describe a
situation or a set
of events
X is happening Observation, field
studies, focus
groups, interviews
Relational Identify relations
between multiple
variables
X is related to Y Observation,
field studies,
interviews
Experimental Describe a
situation or a set
of events
X is responsible
for Y
Controlled
experiments
Note that most of the studies reported in this dissertation aim to identify casual
relationships, so the experimental research method was usually applied.
Determining the design structure of experiments
According to Lazar et al. [LFH10], the basic structure of a controlled experiment
can be determined by answering the following questions:
1. How many independent variables do we aim to explore in the experiment?
2. How many different values does each independent variable have?
The answers to these questions can be derived from the research hypotheses of
the respective experiment. Therefore, research hypotheses should clearly state the
independent and dependent variables of the experiment. In general, independent
variables are factors that the researcher controls and dependent variables are the
effects that the researcher measures. More specifically, in an experiment the re-
searcher aims to find out whether and how changes in the independent variables
imply changes in the dependent variables. Furthermore, the decision to adopt the
appropriate design, namely between-group, within-group or split-plot design, should
be based on the following attributes:
1. The number of conditions in the experiment, i.e. the number of values of each
independent variable.
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2. The nature of application.
3. The participants (size, characteristics etc.).
4. The task to be examined.
Figure 6.1 presents the procedure to determine the structure of experiments. For
more detailed information regarding the determination of the design structure, we
refer the reader to [LFH10].
Figure 6.1: Research methods: Procedure to determine the structure of an experiment.
Types of experimental design
Lazar et al. [LFH10] distinguishes between three types of experimental designs,
namely between-group, within-group and split-plot design. In a between-group ex-
periment design, presented in Figure 6.2, each participant is exposed to only one
experiment condition. Thus, the number of groups in the experiment directly cor-
responds to the number of conditions. In contrast, in a within-group experiment
design, presented in Figure 6.3, each participant is exposed to all conditions in the
experiment. Thus, only one group of participants is necessary. Furthermore, a split-
plot design, which is used when more than one independent variable is investigated,
42 6. Background
is a combination of the between-group and within-group experimental designs. This
means that one or more independent variables are investigated through a between-
group design, while the others are investigated through a within-group design.
Figure 6.2: Research methods: Between-group design.
Figure 6.3: Research methods: Within-group design.
Table 6.2 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the fundamental ex-
perimental designs, namely between-group and within-group. For more detailed
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information regarding the different types of experimental design, we refer the reader
to [LFH10].
Table 6.2: Research methods: Advantages and disadvantages of the fundamental exper-
imental design types [LFH10].
Fundamental types of experimental design
Between-group design Within-group design
Advantages Cleaner, Avoids learning
effect, Better control of
confounding factors
such as fatigue
Smaller sample size, Effective
isolation of individual
differences, More powerful
tests
Disadvantages Larger sample size, Large
impact of individual
differences, Harder to get
statistically significant
results
Hard to control learning
effect, Large impact of
fatigue
Types of statistical tests
When investigating a certain phenomenon within a large population, such as eligible
voters, there is no way to collect data from every individual in the population.
Therefore, a smaller group (a sample) from the larger population is selected to
represent the entire population. In order to determine the confidence with respect
to the generalisation of the observed phenomenon to the entire population, statistical
tests are used to process the data collected from the sample.
In general statistical tests can be classified into parametric and non-parametric
tests. Parametric tests, such as t tests, rely on several general assumptions:
1. The sample has an approximately normal distribution.
2. The variables should be at least scaled by intervals.
3. The variance in the data collected from different groups should be approxi-
mately equal.
When the above assumptions are not met, non-parametric tests are used. It
is important to emphasise that non-parametric tests, even though they are called
“assumption free”, also rely on assumptions. Nevertheless, the assumptions of non-
parametric tests are specific to the test. For instance, one of the most commonly
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used non-parametric tests, namely Chi-square, has a specific assumption on the
sample size and independence of the data points.
Note that the selection of the appropriate statistical test and the accurate in-
terpretation of the results are essential for justifying the validity of the reported
findings. Beside the nature of the collected data, the study design is also important
when selecting the statistical test. For more information with respect to the con-
text of use and assumptions of different (parametric and non-parametric) statistical
tests, please refer to [LFH10].
6.2. Additional considerations
In this section we introduce some additional considerations that are shared among
the reported studies, namely the platform for conducting online experiments, par-
ticipants’ experience with electronic voting, ethical considerations and control of
systematic errors. Note that participants’ experience with electronic voting and
ethical considerations are not explicitly mentioned in the reported studies.
Platform for online experiments
In order to create and conduct online experiments we used the SoSci Survey17 online
platform. SoSci Survey is specifically developed for scientific online surveys and/or
experiments. It provides a usable interface and very high flexibility with respect
to the design of online surveys and/or experiments. This enables the creation of
sophisticated online questionnaires and complex experimental designs.
Participants’ experience with electronic voting
In 2009, the German Federal Constitutional Court introduced the principle of public
nature of elections [Fed09]. This principle states that it must be possible for any
citizen/voter to verify the essential steps in the election act and in the ascertainment
of the results reliably and without special expert knowledge, i.e. each election step
must be transparent to the voter.
Since the introduction of the principle of public nature of elections, all electronic
voting systems that were in use, for instance Nedap voting systems, were banned
and judged unconstitutional, because they do not to comply with this principle.
Hence, as all studies reported in this dissertation focus on local elections in Germany
17https://www.soscisurvey.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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(Darmstadt, Hesse), and are conducted in Germany, participants who were younger
than 18 years old in 2005 are not familiar with electronic voting.
Nevertheless to support this dissertation, it is important to emphasise that EasyVote
has been analysed and shown, refer to [HVB12] for the legal analysis, to comply with
the German legal requirements for local elections in Hesse, in particular with the
principle of the public nature of elections. As the legal analysis is in German, we
summarise the most important conclusions:
• Voters can verify their vote without any specialist knowledge.
• Voters are not required to blindly trust the underlying integrity of EasyVote.
• EasyVote enables an automatic tally of single votes (ballots), and also a full
manual tally of votes, similar to traditional paper-based elections.
• The human-readable ballot component is the deciding factor regarding the
tallying process.
• EasyVote strengthens the principle of public nature of elections, since, on the
one hand, voters can better understand the impact of their selections (how
their cast votes are tallied), and on the other hand the tallying process might
be faster and more accurate than in the traditional paper-based elections.
Ethical considerations
An ethics commission at the Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt lays down ethical
requirements for research involving humans18. These requirements are considered in
all reported studies. Hence, participants in the respective study are required to read
and sign19 a declaration of consent. Furthermore, when necessary, participants are
debriefed regarding the actual research goal at the end of the study. Last, but not
least, participants can interrupt and leave the study at any time without needing to
provide a reason.
Control of systematic errors
One of the main challenges in the area of usable security is to avoid potential social
desirability biases [KPW06], also referred as systematic errors. Otherwise partici-
pants may act in a manner perceived to be socially desirable rather than acting as
18http://www.intern.tu-darmstadt.de/gremien/ethikkommisson/index.en.jsp, last ac-
cessed February, 7, 2016.
19For the online studies, participants clicked on a “I agree to the terms” checkbox.
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they actually would in a real world situation [SHB10]. In order to offset social desir-
ability, when necessary, a fictitious instead of the actual research goal is presented
to participants. Nevertheless, in accordance to the ethical considerations introduced
above, participants are debriefed regarding the actual research goal at the end of
the study.
7 Investigating and addressing
secrecy concerns regarding
QR-Codes
The goal of this chapter is to investigate whether voters have secrecy concerns with
respect to the use of QR-Codes and, if so, to address such concerns effectively.
To achieve this goal, we conducted a survey to determine whether voters have
secrecy concerns with respect to the use of QR-Codes. We analysed and summarised
voters’ stated concerns about QR-Codes. Building upon the results of the survey,
we discussed different alternatives on how to address such concerns, and identified
the most appropriate one. Finally, we conducted an online experiment to evaluate
the effectiveness of the identified alternative regarding the allay of such concerns. In
the experiment we used the protection motivation theory [Rog75], as the underlying
theoretical foundation. Note that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
to investigate and address voters’ secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes.
The content of this chapter has been published at the Journal of Information
Security and Applications [9] and the 16th International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction [7].
7.1. Risks and benefits of using QR-Codes
Independent of whether voters have secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes, it is of
crucial importance first to analyse and contemplate the risks and benefits of using
QR-Codes. Hence, with respect to the risks of using QR-Codes, the question is
whether QR-Codes introduce a new attack vector, i.e. whether they constitute an
additional risk regarding vote secrecy. Note that this question relates not only to
EasyVote, but also to other electronic voting schemes/systems that share similar
concepts, for instance [BCH+12, BFL+12, Veg12, BBE+13, Vot08]. The answer to
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this question is no, because by removing QR-Codes the risk that additional informa-
tion, for instance the time of vote casting, can be subliminally introduced into the
printed ballot can not be prevented, refer to [BCT10, Mac10, vBSB13]. Therefore,
the use of QR-Codes does not represent an additional risk regarding vote secrecy.
Furthermore, regarding the benefits of using QR-Codes, they offer several advan-
tages, listed below, in comparison to Optical Character Recognition (OCR) scanners,
which would be the obvious alternative if QR-Codes were removed.
• QR-Code scanners are less expensive than OCR scanners, or even for free.
• Because of inbuilt (in QR-Codes) redundancy, refer to [Int15], QR-Code scan-
ners provide a higher error correction level and therefore are more accurate
than OCR scanners.
• QR-Code scanners can be used for all types of ballots (universal encoding),
while OCR scanners need to be configured and maintained for each type of
ballot.
7.2. Investigating secrecy concerns regarding
QR-Codes
When confronted with electronic voting, most voters focus on non-technical as-
pects, such as “Can I use it?”, “Is my vote choice secret?” and “Will my vote
count?” [OdB04], [OdB09], [AKLM09]. However, if voters believe a technical aspect
endangers their vote secrecy, they might abstain from voting [GHDD13] or alter
their voting behaviour [LSX+13]. Further, Llewellyn et al. [LSX+13] reports that
voters show doubts, i.e. have secrecy concerns, when their ballot contains informa-
tion additional to their selections. Last, but not least, secrecy concerns regarding
barcodes are also mentioned in a technical analysis of various vote verification tech-
nologies for the Maryland State Board of Elections [NSN06]. This issue is thus a
real concern with respect to the acceptability of electronic voting schemes/systems
such as EasyVote. Hence, as the EasyVote ballot contains additional information,
namely the QR-Code, which is a technical aspect that serves to tally ballots semi-
automatically, we postulate that the use of QR-Codes raises secrecy concerns among
voters. Therefore, the goal of this section is to determine whether voters have se-
crecy concerns about the use of QR-Codes and, if so, to analyse and summarise their
concerns. In order to achieve this goal, we conducted a user study. In the following
we describe our study and report the results.
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7.2.1. Overview
In this section we describe the design, setting and evaluation methodology of the
user study.
Design
The main purpose of the study was to determine whether participants (voters) have
secrecy concerns with respect to the use of QR-Codes and to analyse and summarise
their concerns. To achieve this goal we conducted a trail election with EasyVote in
combination with an online exit survey.
The trial election took place alongside the university elections at Technische Uni-
versita¨t Darmstadt in June 2013. In this trial election participants cast a vote to
express their satisfaction regarding their supervisor, namely the orientation phase
tutor and mentor (for freshers), bachelor thesis supervisor (for undergraduates),
master thesis supervisor (for graduated students), PhD thesis supervisor (for PhD
students), line manager (for employees), and the president (for professors). Partici-
pants could express their satisfaction by selecting one of the following options:
1. Always satisfied.
2. Mostly satisfied.
3. Sometimes yes sometimes no.
4. Rarely satisfied.
5. Never satisfied.
After casting their vote in the trial election, participants filled in the exit survey.
The exit survey consisted of a number of questions and statements regarding the
implemented prototype (EasyVote) and electronic voting in general. In particular, in
alignment with our goal, the survey required participants to indicate their agreement
with and comment on the following statement:
Statement regarding QR-Codes: I think that vote secrecy might be violated by
the use of the QR-Code.
Thus, while the survey directly served our actual research goal, the goal of the
trial elections was twofold:
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1. Hide the actual goal of the study to avoid potential social desirability bias,
see section 6.2. Therefore, in the study participants were given the following
fictitious goals:
a) Evaluation of the EasyVote prototype from a technical and practical per-
spective.
b) Evaluation of electronic voting in general.
2. Induce a personal relevance to the ballot regarding secrecy, in order to create
a realistic voting scenario.
Note that in the time of this study, the EasyVote prototype for complex elections
was not implemented yet. Therefore, for the purpose of the study, we implemented
and deployed a simplified prototype.
Setting
Figure 7.1 provides a general overview of the setting used in our study. The polling
station, which was placed in the cafeteria next to the university election polling
stations, consisted of these areas:
Figure 7.1: Trial elections: General overview of the user study setting.
• The electoral officials’ area, presented in Figure 7.2.
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• The exit survey area, presented in Figure 7.3.
• The voting booth area, presented in Figures 7.4 and 7.5.
Figure 7.2: Trial elections: The elec-
toral officials’ area.
Figure 7.3: Trial elections: The exit
survey area.
Figure 7.4: Trial elections: The inside
of the voting booth.
Figure 7.5: Trial elections: The outside
of the voting booth.
Further, Figures 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 present the interfaces of the implemented
EasyVote prototype. Finally, for the exit survey we used the SoSci Survey online
platform, refer to section 6.2.
Evaluation methodology
To determine whether participants have secrecy concerns regarding the use of QR-
Codes, we evaluated their responses, on a five-point Likert scale anchored in “strongly
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Figure 7.6: Trial elections: Welcome
screen.
Figure 7.7: Trial elections: Options
screen.
Figure 7.8: Trial elections: Preview
screen.
Figure 7.9: Trial elections: Finish
screen.
disagree” and “strongly agree”, with respect to the statement:
Statement regarding QR-Codes: I think that vote secrecy might be violated by
the use of the QR-Code.
Furthermore, to analyse and summarise participants’ concerns, we conducted a
qualitative analysis of their comments. The qualitative analysis was carried out
by using the Grounded Theory Method [SC90]. In order to identify codes, the
author and another member of the author’s research group independently analysed
participants’ comments by using spread sheets. Each single code was considered,
even when several codes were mentioned by a single participant. The identified
codes were discussed and agreed upon by both reviewers. Note that participants’
comments were translated into English for reporting.
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7.2.2. Procedure
The study consisted of the following sequential steps:
1. Participants read and signed the declaration of consent for participating in the
study.
2. Participants were verbally presented with the goals and the procedure of the
entire study (trial election plus exit survey).
3. Participant were verbally introduced to the vote casting process with EasyVote,
focusing on the voting rules.
4. Participants registered in the electoral register.
5. Participants entered the voting booth, made their selection and deposited their
ballot into the ballot box.
6. Participants filled in the exit survey, either next to our polling stations or from
any other location. The survey also collected demographic data (age range,
gender and education).
7.2.3. Participants: Recruitment, incentives and sample
The participants were recruited verbally, directly after having cast their vote for
the university elections. One of the three electoral officials stood in front of the
electoral officials’ area and asked people to participate in the study. No incentives
were provided, thus participation was purely voluntary.
In total 421 participants cast a vote in the trial election. However, only 198 of
them (135 male, 63 female), see Figure 7.10 for the participants’ age ranges, filled in
the online exit survey. Thus, in the results we consider only 198 participants. The
sample consisted of students from different departments (e.g. sociology, psychology,
mathematics) and employees (e.g. secretaries, care takers, administrative technical
staff) of the Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt.
7.2.4. Results
According to the findings from our exit survey, 79 out of 198 participants were
concerned regarding their vote secrecy in association with QR-Codes. Figure 7.11
presents the distribution of participants’ agreement with the presented statement,
namely “I think that vote secrecy might be violated by the use of the QR-Code.”.
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Figure 7.10: Trial elections: Participants’ age range.
These findings confirm the results reported by Llewellyn et al. [LSX+13] and also
our assumption, that the use of QR-Codes in the EasyVote ballot raises secrecy
concerns among voters.
Figure 7.11: Trial election: Participants’ agreement regarding secrecy concerns with
QR-Codes.
In addition, based on our qualitative analysis we identified two codes. For each
code we also provide two sample comments given by the participants.
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1. Transparency:
a) It is not apparent which information is stored.
b) The QR-Code stores information that is not readable by the human eye.
One cannot see which information is stored, the QR-Code could therefore
store personal data.
2. Technical equipment to verify not available:
a) A QR code is (naturally) a representation of information that is not
written in ”natural language”. Therefore, its’ content cannot be verified
without necessary technical equipment.
b) The QR code is readable only with appropriate technical equipment. The
QR-Code may include additional information, like the voting booth and
time of vote casting, and this cannot be verified without necessary tech-
nical equipment.
Finally, from the participants’ comments, we developed a summarised description
of participants’ concerns:
Description of secrecy concerns: Voters can not verify what information is stored
in the QR-Code reliably. Hence, a malicious voting device could store infor-
mation additional to voters’ selections, for instance the time of vote casting or
the sequential number of cast votes. Such additional information could unam-
biguously link voters to their ballots (cast votes). Thus, vote secrecy would
be violated.
Note that in the analysis we considered only the comments of the 79 participants,
who agreed or strongly agreed with the presented statement.
7.2.5. Discussion and limitations
The study confirmed that the use of QR-Codes in the EasyVote ballot had the
potential to raise secrecy concerns among voters. These findings are in alignment
with the findings of previous studies, namely that voters show doubts, i.e. have
secrecy concerns, when their ballot contains information additional to their selec-
tions [LSX+13]. However, it is possible that the number of participants having
secrecy concerns might be slightly different in a real world situation. The number
might be higher in legally binding elections, where vote secrecy might have greater
importance to voters in comparison to our trial election. The number might also be
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lower, because of the potential bias caused through our study design, i.e. by con-
fronting participants with the statement regarding secrecy concerns in association
with QR-Codes.
Both these perspectives, namely that in reality the number might be slightly
higher or lower, reveal two limitations of our study. Nevertheless, the findings of
our study reveal the potential for doubts and concerns to be caused by QR-Codes.
A more accurate reflection could only be obtained, if voters’ concerns are evaluated
in legally binding elections. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge no such baseline
data exist, even though we are aware of legally binding elections with electronic vot-
ing systems, whose ballots contain information additional to the voters’ selections,
for instance in Argentina [PLA+14] and Ecuador [Poz14]. Therefore, we encourage
researchers and election administrators who are involved in future elections, which
are conducted with such voting systems, to address this issue. Furthermore, the
potential overestimation of the reported results seems plausible for the following
reasons: First, the slightly greater importance of vote secrecy in legally binding
elections and the potential overestimation might cancel each other out in reality.
Second, evaluating voters’ concerns not in combination with a voting scenario, for
instance through an interview or a survey, would be even less representative, because
the ballot (cast vote) has no personal relevance to the voters. Third, evaluating vot-
ers’ concerns indirectly, i.e. without directly asking their opinion regarding secrecy
concerns in association with QR-Codes, would produce unreliable results. In re-
ality, in particular in Germany where the well-known Chaos Computer Club20 is
very active regarding electronic voting, such technical aspects would be sufficiently
discussed and challenged in beforehand, in public. Last, but not least, another lim-
itation is that most of the participants in our study were university members, and
therefore not representative of the larger voting population.
7.3. Addressing secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes
The main goal of this section is to address secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes
effectively. While QR-Codes do not represent an additional risk regarding vote
secrecy, refer to section 7.1, they can still be misused. Such concerns should be
addressed by using risk communication techniques, which helps voters realistically
to assess the likelihood of such a misuse. Hence, to achieve our goal, i.e. to address
such concerns effectively, we use the threat appraisal approach of the protection
20The Chaos Computer Club is the Europe’s largest hacker Association, refer to https://www.
ccc.de/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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motivation theory [Rog75]. Furthermore, we define the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The threat appraisal approach significantly allays voters’ secrecy con-
cerns regarding QR-Codes.
The independent variable is the threat appraisal approach, and the dependent
variable is represented by voters’ secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes.
7.3.1. Overview
In this section we describe the design, setting and evaluation methodology of the
user study.
Design
The main purpose of the study was to test the defined hypothesis. To achieve this
goal we conducted an online experiment.
In the experiment participants were first introduced to the research goal. To avoid
potential social desirability bias, see section 6.2, participants were given a (partially)
fictitious research goal. Hence, participants were told that the goal of the experi-
ment is to actively feed into the EasyVote voting scheme, in particular with respect
to the ballot design, by following the human-centred design principles for interac-
tive systems [Int10]. Next, participants were introduced to the EasyVote voting
scheme, more specifically to the vote casting process. Afterwards, participants were
presented with the description of secrecy concerns regarding QR-Codes, introduced
below. Participants were told that these concerns were raised by participants of a
previous survey. Subsequently, participants were required to indicate their agree-
ment with the presented concerns. In the next step, participants were confronted
with the threat appraisal approach. Finally, participants were required to reassess
their opinion towards the presented concerns.
Description of secrecy concerns: Voters can not verify what information is stored
in the QR-Code reliably. Hence, a malicious voting device could store infor-
mation additional to voters’ selections, for instance the time of vote casting or
the sequential number of cast votes. Such additional information could unam-
biguously link voters to their ballots (cast votes). Thus, vote secrecy would
be violated.
Note that based on our hypothesis and participants’ task, which involves substan-
tial human cognitive and perceptual capabilities (reading and comprehension), we
adopted a basic within-groups design to diminish individual differences effectively.
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Setting
To create the online experiment we used the SoSci Survey online platform, refer to
section 6.2.
Evaluation methodology
To measure the effectiveness of the threat appraisal approach regarding the allay of
secrecy concerns in association with QR-Codes, we compared participants’ agree-
ment, on a five-point Likert scale anchored in “strongly disagree” and “strongly
agree”, with respect to the presented secrecy concerns, before and after the threat
appraisal approach. Finally, to determine the confidence of our measurements we
ran a respective significance test.
7.3.2. Procedure
The online experiment consisted of the following sequential steps:
1. Participants read and confirmed (clicked on the checkbox) the declaration of
consent for participating in the experiment.
2. Participants became familiar with the EasyVote vote casting process, in par-
ticular with the components of the EasyVote ballot.
3. Participants read the description of the secrecy raised by previous participants.
4. Participants indicated their agreement with respect to the presented concerns.
5. Participants were confronted with the threat appraisal approach, which is
introduced in more detail below.
6. Participants reassessed their agreement with respect to the presented concerns.
7. Participants provided their demographics (age range, gender and education).
As recommended in the protection motivation theory [Rog75], the threat appraisal
approach focused on the source of the threat by describing a sample attack of violat-
ing vote secrecy by misusing QR-Codes. The description consisted of the adversary’s
sequential steps, which are introduced below:
1. The adversary needs to gain access to and manipulate the electronic voting
device, such that additional information, like timestamps, would be encoded
in QR-Codes.
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2. The adversary must be physically present in the polling station to record the
name and time voters cast a vote.
3. The adversary needs to have access to the QR-Codes (ballots) in order to
violate vote secrecy. This can only be done after the public tallying phase,
either during transport or by accessing the storage room in the respective
municipality.
7.3.3. Participants: Recruitment, incentives and sample
Participants were recruited via E-Mail and online social networks. No incentives
were provided, thus participation was purely voluntary.
94 subjects (33 female, 61 male) participated, see Figure 7.12 for the participants’
age ranges. Participants had the following education levels: 8 participants had
a secondary school certificate, 11 had an advanced technical certificate, 38 had a
general qualification for university entrance, 18 had a bachelors degree, 12 had a
masters degree or equivalent like diploma, 4 had a Ph.D. and 3 had an alternative
educational degree.
Figure 7.12: Threat appraisal approach: Participants’ age range.
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7.3.4. Results
The findings of the experiment are presented in Figure 7.13 and 7.14. While Fig-
ure 7.13 presents participants’ agreement regarding the secrecy concerns stated in
the previous study, before the threat appraisal approach, Figure 7.14 presents those
after. Note that nine participants were negatively influenced by the threat appraisal
approach, i.e. they rather agreed with the secrecy concerns stated in the previous
study. While 38 participants did not change their opinion, 47 participant were pos-
itively influenced by the threat appraisal approach, i.e. they rather disagreed with
the secrecy concerns stated in the previous study.
Figure 7.13: Threat appraisal approach: Participants’ agreement regarding secrecy con-
cerns about QR-Codes (before).
In order to measure the effect of the threat appraisal approach with respect to the
presented concerns, we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Note that we selected a
non-parametric statistical test, because the data was collected by using an ordinal
scale, namely a Likert scale, refer to section 6.1. The test suggested that the threat
appraisal approach significantly allayed participants’ concerns regarding QR-Codes
(Z = −4.245, p < .001).
7.3.5. Summary, outlook and limitations
The findings of our study revealed that the threat appraisal approach has a signif-
icant effect regarding the allay of secrecy concerns in association with QR-Codes.
These findings suggest that the threat appraisal approach of the protection moti-
vation theory is a promising approach to address secrecy concerns in the context of
electronic voting, in particular regarding QR-Codes. Based on these findings and the
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Figure 7.14: Threat appraisal approach: Participants’ agreement regarding secrecy con-
cerns about QR-Codes (after).
fact that QR-Codes do not represent an additional risk regarding vote secrecy, we
recommend the use of QR-Codes to enable a semi-automatic tallying of the ballots.
It is important to note that most of the participants in our experiment were
relatively young, and therefore may not be representative of the larger voting popu-
lation. Furthermore, due to the adopted study design (within-group), fatigue might
have also slightly influenced our findings. However, we addressed this issue carefully,
by requiring participants to complete only a single task, while the entire experiment
could be completed in less than 30 minutes. Last, but not least, as the presented con-
cerns were rather external than participants’ own thoughts, this might have slightly
influenced our findings regarding the impact of the threat appraisal approach on
participants’ secrecy concerns.
While our findings provide important baseline data and novel directions on ad-
dressing and allaying voters’ secrecy concerns in the context of electronic voting,
future work should address the limitations of the reported study. In particular, more
research is needed to better understand voters’ mental models with respect to new
voting technologies in relation to trust, secrecy and integrity concerns. Furthermore,
future work should also investigate whether secrecy concerns’ regarding QR-Codes
correlate with voters’ readiness to use EasyVote in legally binding elections.

8 Improving and evaluating
the EasyVote ballot design
The goal of this chapter is to identify an EasyVote ballot design, which enables voters
to understand the impact of their selections and to verify their voting intention easily.
To achieve this goal, we proposed three alternative EasyVote ballot designs, which
build upon the design proposed by Jo¨ris [Jo¨r13], refer to section 5.2.1. Further, we
conducted an online experiment to evaluate the three alternative designs with respect
to understandability, i.e. whether voters understand the impact of their selections
(how their cast votes are tallied), and verifiability, i.e. whether voters can verify
their cast vote easily.
The content of this chapter has been published at the 6th International Conference
on Electronic Voting [5].
8.1. Improving the EasyVote ballot design
As stated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the design of bal-
lots (paper and/or electronic) is a complicated challenge [LAC+04]. This challenge
becomes even more complicated in the context of complex elections, i.e. elections
with complex voting rules and huge ballots. The main challenge in such a context
is to develop an optimal ballot design that enables voters to understand the impact
of their selections [VBD11], and to verify their voting intention easily [HBV14].
To the best of our knowledge, there is a single work [Jo¨r13] which proposes a bal-
lot design for complex elections. The main advantage of this proposal, presented in
Figure 5.3 in section 5.2.1, is that it complies with the most well-known recommen-
dations for ballot designs. For instance, language clarity [RL09], ballot (paper audit
trail) usability [ELE15], design consistency [NKQC08] and font type (size, alignment
and style) [Ame16]. Nevertheless, this proposal makes it difficult for voters to verify
their voting intention, because it does not explicitly distinguish between votes that
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are directly cast, and votes that are assigned to candidates automatically, due to the
selection of a party. Furthermore, as the QR-Code encodes the entire information
contained on the human-readable ballot component, i.e. it does also not distinguish
between votes that are directly cast and votes that are assigned automatically, this
ballot design reflects the voter’s intention ambiguously. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present
two ballots, which are identical with respect to the human-readable voter’s selec-
tions (denoted with (1)) and the information encoded in the QR-Code (denoted
with (2)), except for the composition of the cast votes (denoted with (3) and (3’)).
Figure 8.1: EasyVote ballot: First com-
position.
Figure 8.2: EasyVote ballot: Second
composition.
To improve the situation we propose three alternative ballot designs, shown in
Figures 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5.
In order to solve the problem of ambiguity, we propose that, in general, QR-
Codes encode only voters’ direct selections, including the crossed out candidates.
This modification requires an adaptation of the EasyVote vote casting and tallying
prototypes. Furthermore, the tallying prototype should implement the algorithm to
distribute votes in dependence of voters’ direct selections automatically, rather than
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Figure 8.3: EasyVote ballot: Black-
and-white.
Figure 8.4: EasyVote ballot: Hybrid
orange.
Figure 8.5: EasyVote ballot: Compact
orange.
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only relying on the data stored in the QR-Codes. It is important to emphasise that
this modification improves the overall security of the EasyVote scheme by enforcing
the principle of separation of duty regarding the vote casting and tallying device. In
addition, for the sake of clarification we added a short text description on top of the
QR-Code and a strikethrough on the crossed out candidates. Note that with the
exception of these improvements, the first alternative, the Black-and-white ballot
design, is similar to the ballot design introduced in section 5.2.1.
Furthermore, to improve the ease of verification the second (Hybrid orange) and
third (Compact orange) alternative designs use colour. According to Braun and
Silver [BS95], the colour red conveys the highest level of perceived hazard followed
by orange, black, green and blue. In addition, Young and Wogalter [YW90] found
that with respect to memory times print highlighted with orange was better remem-
bered than non-highlighted text. Moreover, since red is problematic for a significant
percentage of the male population due to colour blindness, orange seems the best
choice. Therefore, both alternatives highlight voters’ direct selections in orange,
and imply that voters verify only the highlighted selections. Last, but not least, the
Compact orange ballot design simplifies things even further, because it contains only
voters’ direct selections. It is important to note that this design contains the same
amount of information as the ballot in the paper-based election. Therefore, it might
be inferior compared to the Black-and-white and Hybrid orange ballot designs with
respect to understandability. Note that by introducing colour the vote casting and
tallying prototypes need to be adapted. While the vote casting prototype should
highlight (on the review screen) and print voters’ direct selections in orange, the
tallying prototype should also highlight voters’ direct selections in orange. Finally,
a colour printer is necessary.
While the next section evaluates the proposed alternative ballot designs regarding
understandability and verifiability of the cast vote, Table 8.1 presents a hypothetical
comparison thereof. This comparison is based on the above arguments, namely that
the Hybrid orange and Compact orange ballot designs improve the ease of verification
and that the Compact orange lowers understandability.
8.2. Evaluating different EasyVote ballot designs
In this section we evaluate the EasyVote ballot designs, proposed in the previous
section, with respect to understandability, i.e. whether voters understand the impact
of their selections (how their cast votes are tallied), and verifiability, i.e. whether
voters can verify their cast vote easily. Furthermore, based on the hypothetical
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Table 8.1: EasyVote ballot: Comparison of the different EasyVote ballot designs.
Understandability Verifiability
Black-and-white vs. Hybrid orange = <
Black-and-white vs. Compact orange > <
Hybrid orange vs. Black-and-white = >
Hybrid orange vs. Compact orange > =
Compact orange vs. Black-and-white < >
Compact orange vs. Hybrid orange < =
Note that A = B means that ballots A and B are equal regarding
the respective criterion. Further, while C < D means that ballot D
is better than ballot C, E > F means that ballot E is better than
ballot F regarding the respective criterion.
comparison in Table 8.1 we define the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis U1: There is no significant difference between the Black-and-white and
Hybrid orange ballot designs with respect to understandability.
Hypothesis U2: The Black-and-white and Hybrid orange ballot designs are signifi-
cantly better than the Compact orange design with respect to understandabil-
ity.
Hypothesis V1: There is no significant difference between the Hybrid orange and
Compact orange ballot designs with respect to verifiability.
Hypothesis V2: The Hybrid orange and Compact orange ballot designs are signifi-
cantly better than the Black-and-white design with respect to verifiability.
While hypothesis (U1) is derived from the first and third row (left column), hy-
pothesis (U2) is derived from the fifth and sixth row (left column) of Table 8.1.
Further, while hypothesis (V1) is derived from the fourth and sixth row (right col-
umn), hypothesis (V2) is derived from the first and second row (right column) of
Table 8.1. Note that in all defined hypotheses the independent variable is the type
of ballot design, and the dependent variables are understandability and verifiability
of the cast vote.
8.2.1. Overview
In this section we describe the design, setting and evaluation methodology of the
user study.
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Design
The main purpose of the study was to test the defined hypotheses. To achieve this
goal we conducted an online experiment.
In the experiment participants were first introduced to the actual research goal,
namely to actively feed into the EasyVote voting scheme, in particular with respect
to the ballot design, by following the human-centred design principles for interactive
systems [Int10]. Next, participants were introduced to the EasyVote voting scheme,
more specifically to the vote casting process. Further, to assess participants’ under-
standing regarding the vote casting process, we required them to negate or approve
the following statements:
1. The vote is cast by manually marking candidates on the paper ballot.
2. The vote is cast purely electronically.
3. A ballot is printed at the end of vote casting. However, this ballot serves only
for own verification.
4. A ballot is printed at the end of vote casting. The ballot represents the cast
vote.
Note that these statements served to filter out those participants, that did not
take the necessary time to become familiar with the vote casting process. After-
wards, participants were presented with a textual description of a cast vote, which
is introduced below. At this step, participants were also presented with the three
ballot designs simultaneously. Finally, participants were required to rank the three
ballots with respect to understandability and verifiability of the cast vote.
Textual description of the cast vote: Imagine you go to the next local elections
and use the EasyVote voting system to cast your vote. After you identify your-
self to the electoral officials, you enter the voting booth. Next, you start casting
your vote by selecting the SPD party. You are good friends with Sabine
Seidler and Rita Beller of the SPD party and therefore assign both of
them three direct votes. You cross out Dagmar Metzger from the
SPD party, as you can not stand her. You support your neighbours Brigitte
Lindscheid und Christopher Sperling from the GRU¨NE party and as-
sign each of them three direct votes. You agree with the ballot shown on
the review screen and click on finish. Finally, EasyVote prints your ballot.
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Note that in the description we used short sentences for better reading compre-
hension [FP96], and set keywords in bold to improve information cognition [Mar13].
Finally, based on our hypotheses and participants’ task, which is less susceptible to
the learning effect and involves substantial human cognitive and perceptual capa-
bilities (information retrieval), we adopted a basic within-groups design to diminish
individual differences effectively.
Setting
To create the online experiment we used the SoSci Survey online platform, refer to
section 6.2.
Evaluation methodology
To measure the dependent variables, namely understandability and verifiability, we
compared the participants’ rankings of the different ballot designs. Finally, to de-
termine the confidence of our measurements we ran a respective significance test.
8.2.2. Procedure
The experiment consisted of the following sequential steps:
1. Participants read and confirmed (clicked on the checkbox) the declaration of
consent for participating in the experiment.
2. Participants read the goal of the experiment.
3. Participants became familiar with the EasyVote vote casting process.
4. Participants indicated their opinion on four general statements regarding the
vote casting process.
5. Participants read the textual description of a sample cast vote.
6. Participants ranked the three ballot designs with respect to understandability
and verifiability of the cast vote.
7. Participants provided their demographics (age range, gender and education).
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8.2.3. Participants: Recruitment, incentives and sample
The participants were recruited via e-mail, advertising in social networks, flyers and
by personal contact. No incentives were provided, thus participation was purely
voluntary.
In total 87 subjects participated (35 female, 48 male, 4 others) between the ages
of 19-75 years, with an average age of 36.15 years (s = 14.4) and a median age of
40. We removed 14 participants (3 female, 9 male, 2 others), because they did not
answer the statements with respect to the EasyVote vote casting process correctly.
The remaining 73 subjects (32 female, 39 male, 2 others) aged 19-65, with an average
age of 35.37 years (s = 13.79) and a median age of 30, comprised one participant
with apprenticeship, four with a Ph.D. degree, five with middle school qualification,
seven with a B.Sc. degree, seven with a technical college qualification, eight with a
vocational education, 15 with a Diploma/M.Sc. degree and 26 with a high school
qualification.
8.2.4. Results
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 summarise the results of our experiment.
Figure 8.6: Participants’ ranking regarding understandability of the cast vote.
In order to measure the significance of our findings, presented in Figure 8.6 and 8.7,
we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Note that we selected a non-parametric
statistical test, because the data was collected by using an ordinal scale, refer to
section 6.1.
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Figure 8.7: Participants’ ranking regarding verifiability of the cast vote.
The test revealed that the Hybrid orange ballot design is significantly better than
the Black-and-white design regarding both understandability (Z = −6.722; p <
.001), and verifiability of the cast vote (Z = −6.722; p < .001). Similar, the test
suggested that the Compact orange ballot design is significantly better than the
Black-and-white design regarding both understandability (Z = −2.891; p < .004),
and verifiability of the cast vote (Z = −4.205; p < .001). Further, the test revealed
a significant difference between the Hybrid orange and the Compact orange ballot
designs regarding understandability of the cast vote (Z = −3.673; p < .001) with
a higher rank sum for the Hybrid orange design (1993.50). However, no significant
difference was found between these designs regarding verifiability of the cast vote
(Z = −1.945; p < .052).
8.2.5. Discussion and limitations
The study only partially confirmed our defined hypotheses. The findings did not
confirm hypothesis (U1), because the Hybrid orange ballot design is significantly
better than the Black-and-white with respect to understandability. Further, the
findings partially confirmed hypothesis (U2), because only the Hybrid orange ballot
design is significantly better than the Compact orange design regarding understand-
ability. It is important to emphasise that these findings indicate that the use of
colour (orange) also improves understandability. In addition, the findings confirmed
hypothesis (V1), because there is no significant difference between Hybrid orange and
Compact orange ballot designs with respect to verifiability. Last, but not least, our
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findings validated hypothesis (V2), revealing that the Hybrid orange and Compact
orange ballot designs are significantly better than Black-and-white design regarding
verifiability. In summary, the findings of our study indicate that the Hybrid orange
ballot design represents an optimal design with respect to understandability and
verifiability of the cast vote. Consequently, we recommend the use of this ballot
design for EasyVote.
It is important to mention that these findings do not only induce design (inter-
faces) modifications, but also concept modifications that might improve the efficiency
and accuracy (security) of EasyVote. For instance, voters that are familiar with the
voting rules, i.e. those that would not necessarily need support with respect to un-
derstanding the impact of their selections, could only verify their direct selections
(highlighted in orange). Furthermore, in the tallying process, electoral officials could
also verify only voters’ direct selections. Nevertheless, even though the algorithm for
distributing votes automatically is implemented by both the vote casting and tally-
ing device, and is also publicly known, we recommend that electoral officials perform
random audits. This means that for a random set of ballots, electoral officials should
verify the correctness of the algorithm for distributing votes automatically and also
that scanned ballots are added correctly to the intermediate result. This significant
reduction of the number of comparisons for both voters and electoral officials might
also improve accuracy, as potential discrepancies may be easier to detect. In the
following chapters, in particular with respect to the tallying process, we explore the
impact of these improvements regarding efficiency and accuracy.
Note that our findings might be slightly susceptible towards a sample selection
bias, because our sample may not be representative of the larger voting population.
Furthermore, due to the adopted study design (within-group), fatigue might have
also slightly influenced our findings. Nevertheless, in our opinion we addressed the
issue of fatigue carefully, by requiring participants to complete only a single task.
Last, but not least, the entire experiment could be completed in less than 7 minutes.
9 Developing & evaluating
verification instructions
and usability: Voters’ perspective
The main goal of this chapter is to develop verification instructions that make voters
most likely to verify that their ballot matches their intention. In addition, this
chapter aims to evaluate the usability of the implemented EasyVote prototype.
To achieve this goal, we developed verification instructions by considering the
context constraints, the medium of delivery, the position, the time and the design of
such instructions. Further, we identified the most appropriate approach for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of verification instructions with respect to ballot verification.
Finally, we conducted a laboratory experiment to evaluate the developed instruc-
tions and the usability of the implemented EasyVote prototype from the voters’
perspective, i.e. the usability of the vote casting process.
The content of this chapter has been published at the Workshop on Usable Secu-
rity [11] and the Journal of Annals of Telecommunications [1].
9.1. Developing verification instructions
To ensure the integrity of cast votes, EasyVote, similar to all electronic voting
schemes/systems that provide voters with paper audit trails (printed ballots), for in-
stance [SMA16, Ben06, Ben07, Cha04, WV08, BCH+12, BFL+12, Veg12, BBE+13,
Boa14, Vot08], assumes that voters act to verify that their ballot matches their inten-
tion. Nevertheless, previous studies, namely [Sel04, Coh05, HNH+05, mar06, SP06],
reveal that this assumption does not hold true, even though such study participants
often consider paper audit trails to be important [MSG+11]. Therefore, the goal of
this section is to improve the situation by developing verification instructions that
make voters most likely to verify their ballot, i.e. to detect potential discrepancies.
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In order to achieve this goal, we first define the constraints for providing voters
with verification instructions, in particular by considering the context addressed
in this dissertation. Next, we discuss the medium for delivering such instructions,
and identify the most appropriate one. Further, we investigate and determine the
appropriate time and position for providing voters with such instructions. Finally,
we also improve the design of the verification instructions.
9.1.1. Context constraints
In contrast to paper-based elections, where voters manually mark their preferred
candidates/parties on a paper ballot, in electronic voting voters perform an addi-
tional step to ensure the integrity of cast votes, namely they verify that their vote
has been cast-as-intended. To inform or rather make voters to verify, so-called ver-
ification instructions are used. Hence, the aim of such instructions is to ensure the
integrity of cast votes. Therefore, the integrity of verification instructions should
be ensured without relying on the trustworthiness of the electronic voting device.
Displaying the verification instructions on the screen of the voting device is inap-
propriate. A malicious or faulty device might not only alter the printed ballot, but
could also display incorrect verification instructions, for instance “Thank you for
voting. Deposit the ballot into the ballot box.” Similar problems might occur when
verification instructions are printed on the ballot together with the voters’ selections.
Last, but not least, to ensure election integrity, i.e. the integrity of all cast votes,
verification instructions should be provided to all voters. Based on these arguments
we define the following constraints:
1. Verification instructions should not only be displayed on the screen of the
electronic voting device.
2. Verification instructions should not be printed together with the voter’s selec-
tions.
3. Verification instructions should be provided to all voters.
Note that such constraints are context-dependent. For instance, the above list
may not be sufficient when considering visually impaired voters.
9.1.2. Medium of delivery
There are many different tools (media) which can be considered for informing vot-
ers about the use of the electronic voting scheme/system, in particular about the
verification step (instructions). In the following we list the most popular:
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• Television news.
• Radio news.
• Internet news.
• Social networks.
• Newspapers.
• Academic research papers/journals.
• Public debates.
• Blogs/Forums.
• Non-governmental organisations.
• Governmental institutions.
• Election guidelines.
• Election notification.
• Polling stations.
Nevertheless, when delivering important information to voters, such as the ver-
ification instructions, the standard guidelines by Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
[ELE15] recommend that:
1. The verification instructions are publicly available.
2. The verification instructions are accessible to all voters.
3. The verification instructions are standardised with respect to their content.
In order to meet the first recommendation, the verification instructions should be
provided in the respective polling station. Further, to meet the second recommen-
dation, the verification instructions should be included in the election notification.
Note that in Germany the election notification is very often used to identify and
authorise voters. Therefore, we assume that all voters have access to the verification
instructions. Finally, to meet the third recommendation, the verification instructions
should be provided in written form, because there already exist standard guidelines
for written instructions, refer to [RL09, Ame16].
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9.1.3. Time, position and design
According to Nielsen [Nie94], “...instructions should be visible or easily retrievable
whenever appropriate.” This indicates that verification instructions should be pro-
vided in the voting booth (position). Further, in the context of electronic voting,
Redish et al. [RL09] recommend that “...instructions must come “just in time” –
when voters need them.” This indicates that the verification instructions should be
provided in the vote casting process (time).
In order to identify the appropriate position and time we conducted a number of
pre-tests with the following different approaches:
1. Posters on the screen.
2. Posters on the printer.
3. Front of the ballot.
4. Reverse of the ballot.
In the pre-tests we observed whether participants verified the printed ballot, i.e.
whether they detected the deliberately introduced manipulation. We carried out
some informal interviews afterwards. Based on these pre-tests, the most appro-
priate approach was number four. Hence, participants seeing first the verification
instructions, and then turning the ballot to verify its content. It is important to em-
phasise that to ensure the integrity of the verification instructions, the instructions
were pre-printed.
Furthermore, through the pre-tests and with the aid of a designer21 we improved
the design of the verification instructions should. This led to a design consisting of
two pictures, shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2, accompanied by two main sentences and
one auxiliary sentence:
First main sentence: Verify the correctness of the orange marked selections
on the rear.
Auxiliary sentence: In case of mistakes please contact the electoral officials.
Second main sentence: Fold the printed ballot twice.
21The designer works as a student assistant at the author’s research group, and studies at the
University of Applied Sciences Darmstadt in the Faculty of Design, Industrial Design & Com-
munication Design.
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Figure 9.1: Voters’ perspective: The picture associated the first main sentence.
Figure 9.2: Voters’ perspective: The picture associated the second main sentence.
The design of the verification instructions is based on established research results.
Pictures and short sentences are used for better reading comprehension [FP96], and
keywords are underlined and set in bold to improve information cognition [Mar13].
Furthermore, instructions are set in a logical order and written in plain language,
as recommended in the respective standard guidelines, namely [LR06], [RL09] and
[Ame16]. No words are emphasised in the auxiliary sentence, in order not to weaken
the effect of the two main sentences. Note that even though our focus is on integrity
of cast votes, we included the second main sentence to avoid that voters forget to
fold their ballots and thereby violate vote secrecy accidentally.
As the verification instructions presented in the appropriate time and position
should make (stimulate) voters more likely to verify their ballot, in the following we
refer to the verification instructions developed in this section (time, position and
design), as the stimulus.
9.2. Evaluation approaches
In previous studies [Sel04, Coh05, HNH+05, mar06] and [SP06], which investigated
whether voters act to verify that their ballot matches their intention, two different
approaches were used:
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1. Ballot manipulation [Coh05, SP06].
2. Time observation [HNH+05, mar06, Sel04].
Furthermore, another approach that can be used to investigate whether voters act
to verify that their ballot matches their intention, is the approach used by Olembo et
al. [ORBV14], namely participants’ self-reports. Even though this approach was
used in a different setting (Internet voting) and with a different goal, namely to
explore the effects of motivating messages on voters’ intention to verify their vote
by using a smartphone app, it can also be applied in the context of this dissertation.
In the following we describe and report the results of the previous studies, which
are related to the electronic voting context considered in this dissertation. Af-
terwards, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of the three different ap-
proaches, namely ballot manipulation, time observation and participants’ self-reports,
to identify the most appropriate one.
9.2.1. Ballot manipulation
One of the goals in the study conducted by Cohen [Coh05] was to evaluate the
effectiveness, specifically whether participants were able to detect manipulations on
the paper audit trail, of the Low Error Voting Interface [SHGS05]. In the study,
participants were required to cast a vote in four elections by following a voting
agenda, i.e. voting for a pre-defined list of candidates and/or parties. In three
of the four elections, the paper audit trail was altered and one of the following
manipulations was randomly introduced:
1. Change a vote to a different candidate.
2. Remove a vote from a candidate.
3. Remove a complete contest.
While instructions regarding the use were provided in the voting booth and also
by the voting device, instructions regarding ballot verification were displayed on the
final voting screen. Finally, the results revealed that only two out of 36 participants,
recruited from the MIT community, actually verified their paper audit trail and
detected the introduced manipulation.
Similar to Cohen [Coh05], one of the goals in the study conducted by Selker and
Pandolfo [SP06] was to check whether participants verified and detected manipula-
tions on the paper audit trail of the MIT voting prototype. In the study participants
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were required to cast a vote by following a voting agenda with 13 contests. While
the list of candidates was determined for nine of the contests, participants could
chose their preferred candidates in the remaining ones. The paper audit trail was
altered and the following two manipulations were deliberately introduced:
1. Change a vote to a different candidate.
2. Remove a vote from a candidate.
Participants were given verbal instructions regarding ballot verification and the
use of the prototype outside the voting booth. Finally, the results revealed that only
six out of 35 participants, all eligible voters of Arlington town in Massachusetts,
actually verified their paper audit trail and detected the introduced manipulations.
9.2.2. Time observation
One of the goals in the study conducted by Herrnson et al. [HNH+05] was to evaluate
the usability of a voting device with paper audit trails, namely the Avante Vote-
Trakker. In the study participants were required to vote by following a voting
agenda. While instructions regarding the use of the system were given verbally
outside the voting booth, participants were also explicitly required to pay attention
to the paper audit trail. Furthermore, verification instructions were displayed on
the final screen of the voting device. Finally, the results revealed that most of
the 1536 participants, recruited from university student bodies, maintenance staff,
community centres, etc., ignored the paper audit trails, i.e. they did not take the
time to verify their content.
Similar to Herrnson et al. [HNH+05], one of the goals in the study conducted by
The Center for American Politics and Citizenship (CAPC) [mar06] was to evaluate
the usability of the Diebold AccuVote-TSx with AccuView Printer Module voting
system, which provides voters with paper audit trails. In the study participants
were required to vote by following a voting agenda. While instructions regarding the
use of the system were given verbally outside the voting booth, participants were
also explicitly required to pay attention to the paper audit trail. No verification
instructions were provided by the voting device. Finally, the results revealed that
most of the 804 participants, recruited from shopping malls, office buildings, college
campuses, etc., did not take the time to verify their paper audit trail.
Last, but not least, Selker [Sel04] reports that during the legally binding elections
in Reno, Nevada September 7th, 2004, many voters did not take the time to verify
their ballot. Note that only in one out of the 36 observed polling stations, voters were
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provided instructions regarding the use of the voting system. However, no differences
with respect to voters’ behaviour regarding ballot verification are reported.
9.2.3. Comparison of the different approaches
The main advantage of the ballot manipulation approach is that it allows to un-
ambiguously determine whether participants (voters) verify their ballot and detect
potential discrepancies (manipulations). In contrast, relying on the observation of
the time that participants spend in the voting booth after the ballot is printed,
does not allow to unambiguously determine whether participants verify their ballot
and detect potential discrepancies. Participants’ self-reports might produce simi-
lar, unreliable results to the time observation approach. However, some researchers
have found evidence that intention and behaviour are related [VEOS13], and that
behavioural intention is antecedent to actual behaviour [LUB+13].
Based on these arguments, we suggest the use two evaluation approaches simulta-
neously, namely the ballot manipulation and participants’ self-reports approaches.
9.3. Evaluating the verification instructions and
usability
The main goal of this section is to evaluate the effectiveness of the developed stimulus
(time, position and design of the verification instructions) with respect to making
voters to verify their ballot, i.e. to detect potential discrepancies. We focus on the
local elections in Darmstadt, and define the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: The stimulus has a significant effect with respect to making voters to
verify their ballot and thus detect potential discrepancies.
The independent variable is the stimulus, and the dependent variable is the ratio
of detected discrepancies. Note that even though our main focus is on integrity
of cast votes, we also measure the effect of the stimulus regarding vote secrecy,
more specifically whether voters fold their ballot or not. Further, we compare the
used evaluation approaches (ballot manipulation and participants’ self-reports) re-
garding the reliability of their results. Thus, we compare whether the participants’
self-reports approach is as reliable as the ballot manipulation approach with respect
to unambiguously determine whether voters verify their ballot and detect potential
discrepancies. In addition, poor usability is shown to “violate” election integrity, for
instance by influencing the election outcome [NKQC08] or by significantly decreasing
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voter turnout [THhP+05]. Therefore, in this section we also evaluate the usability
of the EasyVote (the implemented prototype) vote casting process according to the
ISO 9241-11 standard [Int98]. Last, but not least, motivated by the research direc-
tions proposed in section 7.3.5, in particular regarding voters’ mental models with
respect to integrity concerns, we explore participants’ perceptions towards ballot
verification. Note that to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to address
these issues regarding electronic voting in the context of complex elections.
9.3.1. Overview
In this section we describe the design, methodology to introduce manipulations,
setting, questionnaires and evaluation methodology of the user study.
Design
The main purpose of the study was to test the defined hypothesis. To achieve this
goal we conducted a laboratory experiment.
In the experiment participants were required to cast a vote with EasyVote in an
election forecast of the forthcoming local election in Darmstadt. Thereby, we inten-
tionally and randomly manipulated each participant’s ballot. Further, to simulate a
realistic voting scenario, i.e. to induce a personal relevance to the ballot, in contrast
to previous, related studies [Sel04, Coh05, HNH+05, mar06, SP06], participants were
free to select their preferred candidates and/or parties.
In addition, to avoid potential social desirability bias, see section 6.2, participants
were given a fictitious research goal. Thus, participants were told that they are
taking part in a research experiment, which emerged from a collaboration between
the computer science and political science departments at the Technische Universita¨t
Darmstadt. The stated research focus was said to be twofold:
1. The political science department is interested in the development of democracy
in Germany. Hence, the research experiment aims to compare citizens’ interest
and motivation to actively participate in politics. The experiment claims to
conduct a comparison between citizens involved in the 1960s protest move-
ments and the citizens of today. To achieve this goal participants are asked to
cast a vote in an election forecast of the forthcoming local elections in Darm-
stadt. Furthermore, to strengthen the credibility of this research focus, we
used real candidates and parties.
2. The computer science department is interested in evaluating the usability of
the implemented EasyVote prototype.
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Further, based on our hypothesis and participants’ task, which is highly suscep-
tible to the learning effect, we adopted a basic between-groups design. Hence, the
experiment consisted of two groups:
1. The treatment group.
2. The control group.
While the treatment group got the stimulus, the control group got the verification
instructions as part of the experiment guidelines, simulating voters that get the
verification instructions as part of the election notification. Finally, to exclude the
turning of the printout (printed ballot) as the cause to verify its content, participants
in the control group were confronted with the blank side of the printout.
Introducing manipulations: Altering the printed ballot
In the experiment we manipulated the ballot of each participant intentionally. We
used the following manipulations:
1. Exchange a party, including its candidates.
2. Exchange a crossed out candidate.
3. Exchange a directly selected candidate.
4. Exchange votes between directly selected candidates.
The second and fourth manipulation changed only the distribution of cast votes.
The first and third manipulation introduced new content into the printed ballot, for
instance a new party and/or a new candidate. Note that these manipulations were
also used in similar, previous studies [Coh05, SP06, Eve07].
Furthermore, we introduced the manipulations in a pseudo-random fashion, rather
than truly random. This means that we always introduced a single manipulation
from the above list in dependency of the participants’ direct selections. If manip-
ulations are introduced truly at random, they might be very easy to detect. For
instance, if the participant selects only a party, the introduced manipulation can-
not be the second, third or fourth, otherwise the manipulation is very obvious.
Such a manipulation methodology, i.e. introducing manipulations truly at random,
wouldn’t simulate the behaviour of a real world adversary, whore aim is to manip-
ulate the election outcome without being detected. Otherwise, this would bias our
findings and lead us to false conclusions. Based on the above argument, we did not
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simply remove or introduce candidates and/or parties, but rather pseudo-randomly
exchanged (altered) participants’ selections, such that we preserved a similar distri-
bution of directly cast votes, i.e. of orange marked selections. For instance, if the
participant selected party X out of 10 parties, we randomly altered participant’s
selection to party Y from the 9 remaining parties, excluding party X. Note that as
all invalid ballots share the same look, refer to section 5.2.1, we refrained to alter
such ballots.
Table 9.1 provides on overview of our methodology to introduce manipulations,
while considering all possible combinations to fill in a ballot.
The column Voting options describes the available options to fill in a ballot
according to the strict letter of the voting rules. Note that we do not distinguish
between one, two or three directly cast votes, because practically this does not
make any difference, if we shall preserve a similar distribution of orange marked
selections. For instance, if the participant selects only one candidate and assigns to
that candidate either one, two or three direct votes, the selected candidate would be
exchanged by preserving the same number of votes assigned by the participant. It
is important to emphasise that the voting options, namely select one, several (same
votes), several (different votes), are mutually exclusive.
The column Possible combinations describes all possible combinations to fill
in a ballot according to the strict letter of the voting rules. Thereby, “X” denotes
the participant’s selection, “(X)” denotes the participant’s optional selection, and
“–” denotes no selection with respect to the available option.
The bottom column Manipulations describes the category of manipulations ran-
domly introduced, depending on the participants’ selections. Note that the category
of the introduced manipulation is restricted with respect to the ease of detection.
For instance, in all combinations where the participant might have selected a party,
denoted by “(X)”, we refrained from introducing the first manipulation, namely
Exchange a party, including its candidates.
In the following we describe Table 9.1 in more detail.
1. The participant selects only a party, implying that only the manipulation Ex-
change a party, including its candidates can be introduced.
2. The participant selects only a party and crosses out at least one candidate,
implying that only the manipulation Exchange a crossed out candidate is ran-
domly introduced.
3. The participant selects only one direct candidate (in combination with select-
ing a party), implying that only the manipulation Exchange a directly selected
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Table 9.1: Voters’ perspective: Introducing manipulations in a pseudo-random fashion.
Voting options Possible combinations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Select a party X X (X) X (X) X (X) X
Select direct
candidates
One – – X X – – – –
Several
(same
votes)
– – – – X X – –
Several
(diff.
votes)
– – – – – – X X
Cross out candidates – X – X – X – X
1 2 3 2, 3 3 2, 3 3, 4 2-4
Manipulations
candidate is randomly introduced.
4. The participant selects one direct candidate, a party and crosses out at least
one candidate of the selected party, implying that either Exchange a crossed
out candidate or Exchange a directly selected candidate is randomly introduced.
5. The participant selects direct candidates and assigns them the same num-
ber of votes (in combination with selecting a party), implying that only the
manipulation Exchange a directly selected candidate is randomly introduced.
6. The participant selects direct candidates, assigns them the same number of
votes, and selects a party and crosses out at least one candidate of the selected
party, implying that either Exchange a crossed out candidate or Exchange a
directly selected candidate is randomly introduced.
7. The participant selects direct candidates and assigns them a different number
of votes (in combination with selecting a party), implying that either Exchange
a directly selected candidate or Exchange votes between directly selected candi-
dates is randomly introduced.
8. The participant selects direct candidates, assigns them a different number of
votes, and selects a party and crosses out at least one candidate of the selected
party, implying that either Exchange a crossed out candidate or Exchange a di-
rectly selected candidate or Exchange votes between directly selected candidates
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is randomly introduced.
Finally, to identify which manipulation category was introduced in the ballot of
each participant, we encoded the respective category in the QR-Code.
Setting
Figure 9.3 provides a general overview of the setting used in the experiment. The
experiment took place in our laboratory. It is important to note that we used two
ballot boxes, in order to distinguish between participants that detected and those
that did not detect the manipulation. One of the ballot boxes was hidden behind
the experimenter table.
Figure 9.3: Voters’ perspective: General overview of the experiment setting.
While Figure 9.4 presents the voting booth from the outside, Figure 9.5 presents
the voting booth from the inside.
Further, in the experiment we used an adapted implementation of the EasyVote
prototype, introduced in chapter 5. We adapted the prototype with respect to the
ballot design, according to the findings in chapter 8. Figure 9.6 presents a sample
ballot and the pre-printed verification instructions on the reverse of the ballot. Note
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Figure 9.4: Voters’ perspective: The in-
side of the voting booth.
Figure 9.5: Voters’ perspective: The
outside of the voting booth.
that for the sake of the experiment we exchanged the word “electoral officials” with
“experimenter”, and adapted the description of the election on top of the ballot.
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Figure 9.6: Voters’ perspective: A sample ballot with the pre-printed verification in-
structions. (English translation)
In addition, to fulfil the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) standard usability re-
quirements for electronic voting [ELE15], in particular regarding the public avail-
ability and standardisation of vote casting instructions, we developed a poster, see
Figure 9 in section B in the appendix. To ensure that the instructions were (pub-
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licly) available to all participants, i.e. that all participants noticed the instructions
and took the time to become familiar with the vote casting process, we hung the
poster on the outside, instead on the inside, of the voting booth. This also enabled
us to better control the effect of the stimulus with respect to ballot verification (de-
tecting manipulations). Last, but not least, to provide participants with standard
instructions, the poster was based on the developed verification instructions, refer
to section 9.1. In summary, the purpose of the poster was twofold:
1. Instruct participants how to cast a vote with EasyVote.
2. Provide participants with standardised vote casting instructions, to avoid po-
tential social desirability bias that may arise when giving verbal instructions.
Questionnaires
Demographics. This questionnaire served to collect participants’ demographic
data (gender, age, and education).
Pre-questionnaire. This questionnaire served to measure participants’ general
interest in politics, and also to conceal our actual research goal.
Post-questionnaire. This questionnaire served to compare the used evalua-
tion approaches, namely participants’ self-reports and ballot manipulation. Conse-
quently, the questionnaire contained the following statement:
• I have verified the correctness of the orange marked selections on the ballot.
Furthermore, to assess participants’ perceptions towards ballot verification, we
added the following statements to the questionnaire:
• I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be a demanding task.
• I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be an error prone task.
SUS. This questionnaire served to measure participants’ satisfaction with respect
to the EasyVote vote casting process.
Evaluation methodology
In the experiment, and therefore also in our evaluation, we distinguish between the
following evaluation categories:
1. Stimulus : Integrity of cast votes and vote secrecy.
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2. Evaluation approach: Ballot manipulation versus participants’ self-reports.
3. Usability of EasyVote: Effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the vote
casting process.
4. Mental models: Participants’ perceptions towards ballot verification.
In the following we introduce the evaluation methodology for each of the above
categories.
Stimulus In order to measure the effectiveness of the stimulus with respect to in-
tegrity of cast votes, i.e to test the defined hypothesis, we manipulated the ballot of
each participant, and observed whether she detected the introduced manipulation.
Further, to determine the confidence of our measurements we ran a respective sig-
nificance test. In addition, to measure the impact of the stimulus regarding vote
secrecy, we took note whether participants folded their ballot after leaving the voting
booth.
Evaluation approach In order to compare the evaluation approaches, namely par-
ticipants’ self-reports and ballot manipulation approach, we compared participants’
actual behaviour, i.e. whether they detected the manipulation, and their answers
on the following statement of the post-questionnaire:
• I have verified the correctness of the orange marked selections on the ballot.
Usability of EasyVote To evaluate the usability of the vote casting process, we
defined effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction according to our context as follows:
Effectiveness: The ability of participants to cast their vote. We further specified
the task of casting a vote by the following sub-tasks:
1. Participant starts the vote casting process.
2. Participant makes her selections.
3. Participant prints the ballot.
4. Participant verifies that the ballot matches her intention.
5. Participant folds the ballot.
6. Participant deposits the ballot into the ballot box.
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We measured effectiveness by observing the vote casting process and filling in a
check-list that consisted of these sub-tasks. In case of queries by participants with re-
spect to any of the defined sub-tasks, we denoted that sub-task as not accomplished.
Note that the fifth sub-task corresponds to the main goal of our experiment.
Efficiency: The time participants spent casting their vote. We further specified
the time of vote casting by the following time intervals:
1. Time spent to read the voting rules.
2. Time spent to make selections.
3. Time spent to verify the printed ballot.
To measure the first time interval we used a stopwatch and observed the enabling
device. More specifically we measured the time between two events:
1. Participant enters the voting booth.
2. The red LED light of the enabling device turns on.
Further, the EasyVote prototype measured the second time interval, i.e. the time
passing between the start of the vote casting process and the start of the printing
process. In order to measure the third time interval, we first measured the total time
that a participant spent in the voting booth and the average time that the prototype
took to print the ballot. Afterwards, we subtracted the time elapsed during the first
and second time intervals, and the average printing time from the total time spent
in the voting booth.
Satisfaction: The level of satisfaction participants experienced while casting their
vote. In order to measure satisfaction we used a German translation [LS13] of the
original SUS questionnaire [Bro96].
Mental models In order to measure participants’ perceptions towards ballot ver-
ification, we measured participants’ responses, on a five-point Likert scale anchored
in “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree”, with respect to the following statements
of the post-questionnaire:
• I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be a demanding task.
• I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be an error prone task.
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9.3.2. Procedure
The experiment was carried out in our laboratory. The participants were randomly
assigned to the two groups (control and treatment). In the experiment each partic-
ipant had to perform the following sequential steps:
1. Read and sign the declaration of consent for participating in the experiment.
2. Read the experiment guidelines, which also contained the goal of the experi-
ment.
3. Provide the demographics.
4. Fill in the pre-questionnaire regarding the political interest.
5. Read the poster describing the vote casting process, in order to become familiar
with it.22
6. Cast a vote and deposit the ballot into the ballot box.
7. Fill in the post-questionnaire.
8. Fill in the SUS questionnaire.
9. Debrief: Reveal the actual research goal.
If a participant detected the manipulation, debriefing took place before filling
in the post-questionnaire. Furthermore, in order to ensure vote secrecy, the experi-
menter instructed participants that did not fold the ballot to fold it before depositing
it into the ballot box.
9.3.3. Participants: Recruitment, incentives and sample
Participants were recruited via flyers and by personal contact. In order to encourage
participation we provided e10 per participant.
44 subjects participated (14 female, 30 male), ranging in age from 20-75, with
an average age of 31.45 years (s = 13.44) and a median age of 25. Further, par-
ticipants had the following educational levels: One participant had completed an
apprenticeship; 20 participants had a high school degree or less; and the rest of the
participants had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.
22Note that if participants had questions regarding the vote casting process while reading the
poster, they could ask the experimenter.
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9.3.4. Results
We report the findings of our experiment according to the categories defined in the
evaluation methodology:
1. Stimulus : Integrity of cast votes and vote secrecy.
2. Evaluation approach: Ballot manipulation versus participants’ self-reports.
3. Usability of EasyVote: Effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the vote
casting process.
4. Mental models: Participants’ perceptions towards ballot verification.
Stimulus
The participants in the treatment group detected the randomly introduced manipu-
lations more frequently with 81.81% (18 out of 22) compared to 36.36% (8 out of 22)
of participants in the control group. In order to determine if there is a relationship
between the categorical variables stimulus and manipulation detection among both
groups, we ran a Chi-square test. The Chi-square test suggested that there is a
significant difference in detecting the manipulation between the treatment and the
control group (χ2 = (1, N = 44) = 9.402, p < 0.002).
Furthermore, except for those participants that detected the introduced manipu-
lations, all other participants folded their ballot. To ensure vote secrecy, the experi-
menter instructed participants that detected the manipulations, to fold and deposit
their ballot into the respective ballot box.
Last, but not least, Figure 9.7 provides an overview of the frequency of occurrence
for each manipulation category and whether it was detected or not. The manipu-
lation categories, which were considered in the present experiment, are introduced
below.
1. Exchange a party, including its candidates.
2. Exchange a crossed out candidate.
3. Exchange a directly selected candidate.
4. Exchange votes between directly selected candidates.
92
9. Developing & evaluating verification instructions and usability: Voters’
perspective
Figure 9.7: Voters’ perspective: Frequency of occurrence and detection of each manipu-
lation category.
Evaluation approach
In total 26 (18 from the treatment and 8 from the control group) out of 44 partici-
pants detected the introduced manipulations and also noted in the post-questionnaire
to have verified the correctness of their ballot. Further, 16 (3 from the treatment and
13 from the control group) out of 18 participants, who did not detect the introduced
manipulations, claimed in the post-questionnaire to have verified the correctness of
their ballot.
Usability
For the sake of completeness, we report the findings of our usability evaluation for
both groups (control and treatment). Nevertheless, in the next section we discuss
only the results from the treatment group, because this group used the state of the
art EasyVote.
Effectiveness: Figure 9.8 presents the percentage of participants that were able
to cast their vote successfully, according to the sub-tasks defined in section 9.3.1.
Except for the sub-tasks that were affected by the introduced manipulations, namely
verify and fold the ballot, all other sub-tasks were successfully accomplished by all
participants.
Last, but not least, it is important to emphasise that none of the participants
cast an invalid ballot, and that no questions were asked regarding the vote casting
process while reading the poster.
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Figure 9.8: Voters’ perspective: The percentage of participants that cast their vote
successfully.
Efficiency: Figure 9.9 presents the average time that participants spent to cast
their vote, according to the time intervals defined in section 9.3.1.
Figure 9.9: Voters’ perspective: The average time (in seconds) that participants spent
to cast their vote.
Satisfaction: For the SUS questionnaire we distinguish between the following
categories:
1. Treatment group.
2. Control group.
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3. Manipulation detected.
4. Manipulation not detected.
For the first category the SUS questionnaires resulted in an average value of 79.29
(σ = 13.80). Further, in the second category, the SUS questionnaires resulted in
an average value of 80 (σ = 13.11). While the scoring of the SUS questionnaires
from the third category resulted in an average value of 80 (σ = 14.78), the scoring
of those from the fourth category resulted in an average value of 79.86 (σ = 13.07).
Mental models
Figures 9.10 and 9.11 present the distribution of participants’ perceptions towards
ballot verification, namely whether participants perceived ballot verification as de-
manding and error prone.
9.3.5. Summary and limitations
The findings of our study revealed that the stimulus has a significant effect with
respect to ballot verification. Significantly more manipulations were detected when
the stimulus was present. Our findings, not only validate our hypothesis, but reveal a
significant improvement in comparison with previous, related studies. Furthermore,
with the exception of the participants that detected the manipulations, all other
participants folded their ballot. This indicates that the stimulus seems to not prevent
voters from folding their ballot. In summary, these findings show that the stimulus
has a positive impact on the security, more specifically on ensuring the integrity of
cast votes, of EasyVote and all similar voting schemes/systems.
In total 18 participants did not detect the manipulation, and 16 thereof reported to
have verified their ballot. This reveals that self-reported statements are not reliable.
Thus, similar studies should use the ballot manipulation approach, otherwise it is
not possible to unambiguously determine whether voters verify their ballot or not.
The usability evaluation revealed that EasyVote is significantly better than other
similar schemes/systems, represented by EasyVote without the stimulus, regarding
effectiveness, i.e. the ability of participants to cast a vote successfully. Further,
EasyVote seems to be as efficient as other similar schemes/systems, for instance
VoteBox [EGB+08b] representing DREs or EasyVote without the stimulus repre-
senting DREs with paper audit trails. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
efficiency might be slightly better, when considering simple elections. Last, but not
least, the SUS questionnaires resulted in an average value of 79.29 (σ = 13.80) which
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Figure 9.10: Voters’ perspective: I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be
a demanding task.
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Figure 9.11: Voters’ perspective: I perceived the verification of the printed ballot to be
an error prone task.
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according to Sauro’s normalisation method [Sau11] can be interpreted as a grade
of B. Consequently, EasyVote (the implemented prototype) has a high perceived
usability.
In addition, 79.5% of the participants, namely 35 out of 44 participants, perceived
ballot verification as an easy task. Further, 29.6% of the participants, namely 13
out of 44 participants, perceived ballot verification as an error prone task. It is
important to emphasise that the majority of the participants who perceived ballot
verification as an error prone task, namely 69.2% (9 out of 13 participants), also
detected the introduced manipulation. Hence, manipulation detection seems to have
lead participants to perceive ballot verification as an error prone task. Furthermore,
the treatment and the control group did not differ with respect to their perceptions
regarding ballot verification. Even though the majority of the participants perceive
the act of verification as easy, it is important to determine, and allay the factors
which make participants to perceive ballot verification as error prone.
While the above findings are very promising and represent the first contribution
of this chapter, it should be emphasised that this chapter has a second important
contribution. Hence, this chapter introduces a new research design for testing hy-
potheses related to ballot verification by voters. In the following we provide a list
of recommendations for such research studies:
• Participants should select their own preferred candidates and/or parties.
• Participants should be deceived.
• Participants should cast a vote for an election that has relevance to them.
• Necessary measures should be taken to prevent any unintentional violation of
vote secrecy.
• Real candidates and parties should be used.
• The ballot manipulation approach should be used.
The limitation of the present study is that participants in this sample might be
more interested in politics, being self-selecting, than the general voting population.
Therefore, these individuals might be more likely to verify their ballot and detect
manipulations in comparison to the average voter. As such, the prevalence of veri-
fication of the ballot and detection of the manipulations might be relatively biased
to the general voting population. Moreover, we made the manipulation reporting
very simple, while in genuine elections this may require strict organisational proto-
cols, perhaps a signed form. Furthermore, in legally binding elections the results
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regarding the verification and detection of manipulations might be slightly different
than in a non-legally binding election forecast. Finally, the number of voters that
verify their ballot and detect manipulations might be different, depending whether
the participation in the election is compulsory or voluntary.
10 Improving & evaluating the
verification setting and usability:
Electoral officials’ perspective
The main goal of this chapter is to identify an effective verification setting that
makes electoral officials most likely to detect potential discrepancies between the
human- and machine-readable (QR-Code) ballot components. Furthermore, this
chapter aims to evaluate the usability of the implemented EasyVote prototype.
To achieve this goal, we proposed an alternative verification setting, which builds
upon findings other research areas such as psychology. Further, we conducted a lab-
oratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed verification setting
with respect to detecting discrepancies between the human-readable ballot compo-
nent and the associated QR-Code. Thereby, we also evaluated the usability of the
implemented EasyVote prototype from the electoral officials’ perspective, i.e. the
usability of the tallying process.
The content of this chapter has been published at the Journal of Annals of
Telecommunications [1].
10.1. Improving the verification setting
Similar to voters, whose primary task is to cast their vote rather than verify, electoral
officials’ primary task is to tally the election result rather than verify that the
human-readable ballot component matches the content stored in and scanned from
the associated QR-Code. In addition, electoral officials have to scan a relatively
large number of individual ballots, one after the other, and thereby accuracy of the
tallying process relies on human (electoral officials) attention.
Previous studies, even though from other research areas, such as airport baggage
screening [WHK05, MM10] or cancer screening [GSR+04], report that human atten-
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tion is notoriously unreliable. This is especially the case when the prevalence of the
target to be noticed is low [RKW+08, WHW+07], when the searcher has to look for
multiple different targets at the same time [MCD09] and when the size of the area
to be searched is large [ZF97]. As all these characteristics hold true for EasyVote
(ballot and tallying process), it is important to address this human limitation. Fur-
thermore, the results of our first experiment (EasyVote verification setting) confirm
this limitation. Therefore, to improve the situation, we propose that electoral offi-
cials read voters’ direct selections out loud, while they tally the election result (the
individual ballots). Because reading out loud is shown to increase and require more
attention than “reading” silently [Swa72, Lev79, Kra95, ORSB08].
Note that in the local elections in Darmstadt, electoral officials also read voters’
direct selections out loud, while they tally the election result. However, this serves
to transfer the votes, from the ballots into the PC-Wahl, rather than to ensure the
accuracy of the process.
10.2. Evaluating different verification settings and
usability
The main goal of this section is to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed verifica-
tion setting with respect to making electoral officials to detect discrepancies between
the human-readable ballot component and the associated QR-Code. We focus on
the local elections in Darmstadt, and define the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Reading the voter’s direct selections out loud has a significant impact
on detecting potential discrepancies between the human-readable ballot com-
ponent and the associated QR-Code.
The independent variable is reading out loud and the dependent variable is the ra-
tio of detected discrepancies. Furthermore, poor usability is shown to “violate” elec-
tion integrity, in particular by influencing the election outcome [NKQC08]. There-
fore, we also evaluate the usability of the EasyVote (the implemented prototype)
tallying process according to the ISO 9241-11 standard [Int98]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to address these issues regarding electronic voting
in the context of complex elections.
10.2.1. Overview
In this section we describe the design, materials, methodology to introduce manip-
ulations, setting, and evaluation methodology of the user study.
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Design
The main purpose of the study was to test the defined hypothesis. To achieve this
goal we conducted a laboratory experiment. Note that due to the experiment’s goal
we only focus on the second phase of the tallying process.
In the experiment participants (groups of two individuals as suggested in sec-
tion 5.1) were required to perform the tallying process with EasyVote. Thereby,
participants were first trained to use the prototype, similar to the local elections in
Darmstadt. Afterwards, participants tallied the ballots that belonged to one polling
station of the 2011 local elections in Darmstadt. In the experiment we intentionally
manipulated the QR-Codes of a small set of the ballots to be tallied. It is important
to emphasise that participants were confronted with a different random order of the
same set of manipulations.
In addition, to avoid potential social desirability bias, see section 6.2, participants
were given a fictitious research goal. Thus, participants were told that the goal
was to evaluate the usability [Int98] of, and actively feed into, the implemented
EasyVote prototype by following the human-centred design principles for interactive
systems [Int10].
Note that this experiment (EasyVote + reading voter’s direct selections out loud)
is a replication of the first experiment (EasyVote verification setting), which, for the
sake of completeness, we also report in the following of this chapter. The difference
between the first experiment and the replication was the verification setting. In
contrast to the first experiment, where participants verified that the human-readable
ballot component matches the associated QR-Code silently (refer to section 5), in
the replication participants read voters’ direct selections out loud. Further, in both
experiments only the orange marked selections were verified. Last, but not least,
based on our hypothesis and participants’ task, we adopted a basic within-groups
design.
Materials
In the following we list the materials used in the experiment:
• The EasyVote tallying prototype.
• The training workshop presentation.
• 89 ballots, which were created from the ballots of the 2011 local elections in
Darmstadt. The ballots contained directly selected candidates and/or a party,
as well as crossed out candidates.
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• Five training ballots for the training workshop: Three ballots with candidates
and a party selected, and two ballots that also contained crossed out can-
didates. Two of the five ballots required corresponding corrections by the
participants.
Introducing manipulations: Altering the QR-Code
In the experiment we intentionally manipulated the QR-Codes of a random set of
the ballots to be tallied. We used the following manipulations:
1. Remove votes from a candidate and assign them to another candidate.
2. Remove votes from a candidate and do not re-assign them.
3. Remove a candidate and insert another candidate instead.
4. Remove a candidate.
5. Remove a party, including its candidates.
We decided to manipulate only five out of the 89 ballots to be tallied. This enabled
us to cover all manipulation types and to minimise the probability of guessing the
actual research goal. Finally, to randomly select the type of manipulation, the
ballots to be manipulated, and the positions to introduce the manipulated ballots
into the set of all ballots, we used the service provided by RANDOM.ORG23.
Setting
The experiment took place in a seminar room in the department of computer science
at the Technische Universita¨t Darmstadt. The seminar room was equipped with
tables, chairs and a projector. The projector was used during the presentations
in the respective training workshop. Participants were provided with the necessary
hardware equipment, monitors, a computer on which the tallying software (EasyVote
prototype) was installed, a QR-Code reader, and a printer. Figure 10.1 shows one
group of participants during the experiment.
Further, in the experiment we used an adapted implementation of the EasyVote
prototype. The prototype implemented the algorithm to distribute votes in de-
pendence of voters’ direct selections automatically, and highlighted voters’ direct
selections in orange, as proposed in chapter 8. Figure 10.2 presents the adapted
interface. In addition, electoral officials used the EasyVote ballot design proposed
in chapter 8, see Figure 10.3.
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Figure 10.1: Electoral officials’ perspective: Participants performing the EasyVote tal-
lying process.
Last, but not least, we created a training workshop presentation, presented in
section C in the appendix. We created the presentation based on the one, which
was used in the 2011 local elections in Darmstadt.
Evaluation methodology
In the experiment, and therefore also in our evaluation, we distinguish between the
following evaluation categories:
1. Verification setting.
2. Usability of EasyVote: Effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the tallying
process.
In the following we introduce the evaluation methodology for each of the above
categories.
Verification setting In order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed verifica-
tion setting, we manipulated a random set of the ballots to be tallied, and observed
whether participants detected the introduced manipulations.
23https://www.random.org/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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Figure 10.2: Electoral officials’ perspective: Adapted interfaces for scanning and verifying
the content of the current ballot.
Usability of EasyVote To evaluate the usability of the tallying process, we defined
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction according to our context as follows:
Effectiveness: The ability of participants to tally the correct election result. We
did not define any further sub-tasks to measure effectiveness, because, in contrast to
vote casting, participants are trained to use the EasyVote tallying prototype. Note
that effectiveness corresponds to the main goal of our experiment.
Efficiency: The time participants spent tallying the election result. We further
recorded the following times:
1. Time spent to tally the first five ballots.
2. Time spent to manually tally the first five ballots and verify the correctness
of the first step.
3. Time spent to tally the rest of the ballots.
We used a stopwatch to measure the time spent during the above time intervals.
Satisfaction: The level of satisfaction participants experienced while tallying the
election result. In order to measure satisfaction we used a German translation [LS13]
of the original SUS questionnaire [Bro96].
10.2. Evaluating different verification settings and usability 105
Figure 10.3: Electoral officials’ perspective: The EasyVote ballot design.
10.2.2. Procedure
The participants were randomly assigned to different groups of two people. Further,
each group had to perform the following sequential steps:
1. Read and sign the declaration of consent for participating in the experiment.
2. Participate in the training workshop.
3. Tally the ballots.
4. Debrief: Reveal the actual research goal.
In addition, participants of each group were randomly assigned to independently
perform the following tasks:
1. Operate the prototype.
2. Scan the QR-Codes.
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However, both participants had to verify that the QR-Code matched the human-
readable ballot component simultaneously. Note that the training workshop last 30
minutes, and to address the problem of fatigue, we introduced a 10 minutes coffee
break between the second and the third step.
10.2.3. Participants: Recruitment, incentives and sample
Participants were recruited via e-mail, advertising in social networks and flyers.
Three different incentives encouraged participation: First, the employees of our uni-
versity were interested in science and wanted to support our research. Second, some
of the participants were psychology students, who are required by their department
to participate in 30 hours of research studies. We compensated them with appro-
priate credits in dependence of the total time spent in the experiment. The rest
of the participants were given e10 each. In the following we describe the samples
according to the different experiments.
Sample: First experiment (EasyVote verification setting)
8 subjects participated (2 female, 6 male), who ranged in age from 19-26, with an
average age of 22.5 years (s = 2.1) and a median age of 23. All participants had a
high school degree or less.
Sample: Replication experiment (EasyVote + reading voter’s direct
selections out loud)
40 subjects participated (17 female, 23 male), who ranged in age from 18-54, with
an average age of 26.3 years (s = 8) and a median age of 25. Five participants had
completed an apprenticeship; 21 participants had a high school degree or less; and
13 participants had a bachelor’s degree or equivalent. One participant did not reveal
the level of education.
10.2.4. Results
We report the findings of our experiment according to the categories defined in the
evaluation methodology:
1. Verification setting.
2. Usability of EasyVote: Effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction of the tallying
process.
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Verification setting
Figure 10.4 presents the findings with respect to both experiments. Note that the
first experiment (EasyVote verification setting) revealed very bad results with re-
spect to detecting the introduced manipulations. Therefore, we aborted this ex-
periment after the first four groups. This explains the difference in the group sizes
between both experiments.
Figure 10.4: Electoral officials’ perspective: The effectiveness of verification settings
regarding the detection of manipulations.
Note that due to the different group sizes, in the following we report about the
usability evaluation only with respect to the replication experiment (EasyVote +
reading voter’s direct selections out loud).
Usability
We report the results of our usability evaluation in terms of effectiveness, efficiency
and satisfaction.
Effectiveness: In accordance with the definition of effectiveness, refer to section
10.2.1, the tallying of the election result with the proposed verification setting was,
in average, 99% effective. Thereby, 19 out of 20 groups were 100% effective, while
one group was only 80% effective.
Efficiency. Figure 10.5 presents the average time spent by participants to tally
the election result, according to the time intervals defined in section 10.2.1.
Satisfaction: The scoring of the completed SUS questionnaires resulted in an
average value of 82.29 (σ = 12.03).
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Figure 10.5: Electoral officials’ perspective: The time (in minutes) that participants
spent to tally the election result.
10.2.5. Summary, outlook and limitations
The findings of the study revealed that reading voters’ direct selections out loud has
a significant effect on detecting discrepancies between the human-readable ballot
component and the associated QR-Code. These results validate our hypothesis.
The usability evaluation revealed that EasyVote (with reading out loud) is very
effective with respect to tallying the correct election result. In average, in 99% of
the cases, participants were able to tally the correct election result. While there
exist no reference results with respect to efficiency, the SUS questionnaires resulted
in an average value of 82.29 (σ = 12.03), which according to Sauro’s normalisation
method [Sau11] can be interpreted as a grade of A. Consequently, EasyVote (the
implemented prototype) has a very high perceived usability.
While the above findings are very promising and can be applied to electronic
voting schemes/systems similar to EasyVote, for instance [BCH+12, BFL+12, Veg12,
BBE+13, Vot08], three alternative verification settings could be considered:
1. Replication of the tallying process with different tallying devices, which are
provided by independent developers.
2. Random audits of the electronically stored data, with a random set of ballots.
Note that the tallying process can also be video recorded. Thus, a random
audits can be also performed by using video fragments of the record.
3. Random verifications of the implemented algorithm for distributing votes au-
tomatically and of the second monitor, i.e. that votes are added correctly to
the intermediate result.
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4. Use of cryptographic primitives, for instance hash chains, and replication of
the tallying process with a second, independent tallying device.
Note that the above list is not comprehensive, and it can be extended. Nev-
ertheless, this list serves as a starting point for further discussion and future re-
search. While in our opinion the third option seems the most adequate with re-
spect to its practicality and applicability, it is important to consult the respective
literature, for instance [Nef03, ST14], to determine the appropriate level of assur-
ance. Furthermore, future research should address the issue of electoral officials’
endurance/feasibility with respect to reading voters’ direct selections out loud.
There are three limitations in the present study: First, the results regarding
the detection of manipulations might be similar, even when direct selections are
not highlighted in orange. Nevertheless, a significant difference with respect to
efficiency and satisfaction can be assumed. To achieve better results with respect
to effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction, we suggest deploying both interventions,
namely reading voters’ direct selections out loud and highlighting them in orange.
The second limitation is that most of the participants in this sample were university
students. Hence, they are unlikely to be representative of the larger population
(electoral officials) with respect to age and educational level. Last, but not least,
in legally binding elections the results regarding the verification and detection of
manipulations might be slightly different, depending on whether electoral officials
support similar or different electoral goals (parties).
10.2.6. Additional insights
In this section we provide some additional insights with respect to efficiency measure-
ments of the tallying process. Thereby, we conducted several studies with different
ballots (EasyVote and local elections in Darmstadt) and tallying software (EasyVote
and PC-Wahl). Note that the reported results serve to provide first insights rather
than final results.
Table 10.1 presents the results of the efficiency comparison regarding different
ballot designs with respect to the first phase of the tallying process. The following
ballot types were used in the study:
1. Ballot of the local elections in Darmstadt 2011, refer to Figure 4.1.
2. The black-and-white EasyVote ballot, refer to Figure 8.3.
Further, electoral officials went through the following sequential steps:
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1. Open ballot box and count the total number of ballots.
2. Classify ballots into four categories.
3. Verify that ballots are correctly classified.
4. Manually tally the ballots of category (1).
5. Review ballots of category (4) and assign them to (1-3).
6. Compute the intermediate result manually.
Table 10.1: Electoral officials’ perspective: Efficiency (time in mins) comparison of the
tallying process (first phase, 189 ballots).
Steps
Ballot types
1 2
1 17 4
2 26 4
3 12 3
4 13 4
5 9 0
6 1 0
Total time 78 15
Groups of electoral officials 1 1
Note that the first column is borrowed from the master thesis by Jo¨ris [Jo¨r13].
Even though these results are obtained from a single study group, the difference
between EasyVote and the local elections in Darmstadt is very obvious. The tallying
process with the EasyVote ballots is five times faster than with the ballots from the
local elections in Darmstadt.
Table 10.2 presents the results of the efficiency comparison regarding different
ballot designs and different types of tallying software, with respect to the second
phase of the tallying process. The following combinations of ballots and tallying
software were used in the study:
1. Ballot of the local elections in Darmstadt 2011, refer to Figure 4.1, and PC-
Wahl.
2. The black-and-white EasyVote ballot, refer to Figure 8.3, and PC-Wahl.
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3. The hybrid orange EasyVote ballot, refer to Figure 8.4, and EasyVote tallying
prototype.
4. The hybrid orange EasyVote ballot, refer to Figure 8.4, and EasyVote tallying
prototype with reading out loud.
Further, electoral officials went through the following sequential steps:
1. Tally the first five ballots.
2. Manually tally and verify the correctness of the first steps.
3. Tally the rest of the ballot.
Table 10.2: Electoral officials’ perspective: Efficiency (time in mins) comparison of the
tallying process (second phase, 89 ballots).
Steps
Ballot + software
1 2 3 4
1 6 4 1.25 2.6
2 21 10 11.25 10.85
3 84 62 36.25 49.05
Total time 111 76 49 63
Groups of electoral officials 1 1 4 20
Note that the first column is borrowed from the master thesis by Jo¨ris [Jo¨r13].
Even though these results cannot be conclusively compared due to the different
group sizes, it is important to mention that EasyVote (with reading out loud) is
as fast as the other alternative (EasyVote prototype) and almost twice as fast as
PC-Wahl. Furthermore, PC-Wahl with the EasyVote ballots seems to improve the
efficiency of the tallying process in the local elections in Darmstadt. This might be
interesting in case EasyVote is used only for the vote casting process.

11 Summary and future work direc-
tions
The goal of this dissertation was to pave the way for the use of EasyVote in legally
binding elections. To achieve this goal, this dissertation addressed five open, usable
security, research questions.
The first research question aimed to determine whether voters have secrecy con-
cerns with respect to the use of QR-Codes and, if so, to address such concerns
effectively. The findings suggested that voters do have secrecy concerns in associa-
tion with the use of QR-Codes. Furthermore, the findings revealed that the threat
appraisal approach of the protection motivation theory [Rog75], is a viable approach
to address and significantly allay such concerns.
The second research question aimed to identify a ballot design that enables vot-
ers to understand the impact of their selections and to verify their voting intention
easily. Therefore, three different ballot designs, see Figures 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 in sec-
tion 8.1, were proposed and evaluated with respect to understandability, i.e. whether
voters understand the impact of their selections (how their cast votes are tallied),
and verifiability, i.e. whether voters can verify their cast vote easily. The findings
revealed that the ballot design, which highlights voters’ direct selections in orange,
see Figure 8.4, represents an optimal ballot design with respect to understandability
and verifiability of the cast vote.
The third research question aimed to develop an effective stimulus, i.e. verification
instructions, that makes voters most likely to verify their ballot. The findings re-
vealed that the developed stimulus, consisting of pre-printed verification instructions
on the reverse of the ballot, see section 9.1, had a significant effect on participants’
behaviour with respect to verifying their ballot and detecting potential discrepancies
(manipulations). Hence, these findings show a significant improvement with respect
to ensuring the integrity of cast votes and election result, in comparison to the
results reported by similar, previous studies [Sel04, Coh05, HNH+05, mar06, SP06].
The fourth research question aimed to identify effective verification settings that
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make electoral officials most likely to detect potential discrepancies between the
human-readable ballot component and the associated QR-Code. The findings re-
vealed a significant increase with respect to detecting discrepancies (manipulations)
when participants read voter’s direct selections out loud, while verifying that the
human-readable ballot component matches the data stored in the QR-Code. Hence,
reading out loud significantly improves the security of EasyVote with respect to
ensuring the integrity of the election result in the tallying process.
Last, but not least, the fifth question aimed to evaluate the usability of the imple-
mented EasyVote prototype from the voters’ and the electoral officials’ perspective.
From the voters’ perspective, the findings revealed a significant improvement re-
garding effectiveness due to the presence of the stimulus, i.e. significantly more ma-
nipulations were detected when the stimulus was present. Further, EasyVote seems
to be as efficient as other similar schemes/systems, for instance VoteBox [EGB+08b]
representing DREs or EasyVote without the stimulus representing DREs with paper
audit trails. In addition, the act of casting a vote with the implemented EasyVote
prototype was perceived as satisfactory by the participants, which assigned the pro-
totype the grade B (according to Sauro’s normalisation method [Sau11]). From the
electoral officials’ perspective, the findings revealed a significant improvement re-
garding effectiveness due to reading out loud, i.e. significantly more manipulations
were detected. While there exist no reference results with respect to efficiency, the
tallying process with the implemented EasyVote prototype was perceived as very
satisfactory by the participants, which assigned the prototype the grade A (accord-
ing to Sauro).
In summary, by making the detection of election fraud significantly more likely, the
findings of this dissertation contribute to the improvement of security for electronic
voting schemes/systems that provide voters with paper audit trails (printed ballot).
The latest information and findings about EasyVote, for instance list of publications,
implemented prototype and user studies, can be found at SECUSO24.
While this dissertation successfully addressed the above research questions, there
are still open research questions to be addressed before EasyVote can be used in
legally binding elections. For instance, more research is needed to better under-
stand voters’ mental models regarding trust and secrecy concerns with respect to
new voting technologies. Furthermore, future work should determine, and allay
factors which make participants to perceive ballot verification as error prone. In ad-
dition, future work should address the alignment of EasyVote with respect to legal
requirements, in particular with respect to the public nature of elections, not only
24https://secuso.org/easyvote/, last accessed February, 7, 2016.
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from a concept perspective, as already shown by Henning et al. [17], but rather from
a system perspective. Moreover, future work should address the issue of ensuring
vote secrecy with respect to side-channel attacks, for instance electromagnetic emis-
sions [VE85], tempest [Fri72] or differential power analysis [KJJ99]. Last, but not
least, other future work directions include the extension of EasyVote with crypto-
graphic verifiability [Joa14] or the use of EasyVote as a tool for supporting postal
voters.
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Appendices
A. Interfaces for the vote casting process
Figure 1 to Figure 8 introduce all interfaces for the vote casting process.
Figure 1: Vote casting prototype: Welcome screen containing the voting rules.
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Figure 2: Vote casting prototype: Main screen.
Figure 3: Vote casting prototype: Showing the candidates of the CDU party.
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Figure 4: Vote casting prototype: Searching for a candidate using the search function.
Figure 5: Vote casting prototype: Casting direct votes to candidate number 407.
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Figure 6: Vote casting prototype: View on the current selections in the GRU¨NE party.
Figure 7: Vote casting prototype: Review screen.
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Figure 8: Vote casting prototype: Ballot is printed and the voting device is disabled.
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B. Vote casting instructions for voters
Figure 9 introduces the developed poster, which served to instruct voters on how to
cast a vote with EasyVote.
 
A
B
C
Das Gerät speichert keine Stimmen.
Gezählt wird nur der Ausdruck
Stimmabgabe
2. Auswahl treffen
1. Wahlberechtigungsprüfung
3. Ausdruck entnehmen
4. Orangemarkierte 
  Auswahl überprüfen
5. Ausdruck zweimal falten
6. Stimmzettel in Wahlurne werfen
In der Wahlkabine:
Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich an den Wahlvorstand.
Figure 9: Poster: Vote casting instructions for voters.
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C. Training workshop for electoral officials
Usable Security Lab 
Crypto Lab 
Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 
Jurlind Budurushi 
Figure 10: Training for electoral offi-
cials: First slide.
Agenda 
! Motivation 
! Ziel der Studie 
! Schulung 
! Kurzer Test 
! 10 Min 
! Auszählung 
! Rückmeldung 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 2 
Figure 11: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Second slide.
Motivation: Kommunalwahlen in 
Hessen 
! Eigenschaft 1: Sehr große Stimmzettel 
! Eigenschaft 2: Sehr komplexe Wahlregeln 
! Problem 1: Wähler geben die Stimme unabsichtlich 
ungültig ab 
! Problem 2: Auszählung zeitaufwendig, verstößt 
gegen den Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatz 
Party A  
1 Melanie Volkamer 
2 Jurlind Budurushi 
3 Arne Padmos 
Party B 
1 Maina Olembo 
2 Stephan Neumann 
3 Oksana Kulyk 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 3 
Figure 12: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Third slide.
EasyVote: elektr. Unterstützung 
für Kommunalwahlen in Hessen 
! Wähler: ! Wahlvorstand/Wahlhelfer: 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 4 
Figure 13: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Fourth slide.
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Ziel der Studie:  
Evaluation der Benutzbarkeit 
! Benutzbarkeit der EasyVote-Auszählkomponente  
! Effizienz 
! Effektivität 
! Zufriedenheit 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 5 
Figure 14: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Fifth slide.
Schulung:  
Aufgaben des Wahlvorstandes 
! Öffnen der Wahlurne und prüfen der Gesamtanzahl 
von Stimmzetteln 
! Erfassen/Auszählen der Stimmzettel 
! Endergebnis bestätigen und Protokoll unterschreiben 
! Verpacken der Unterlage und  Übergabe 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 6 
Figure 15: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Sixth slide.
Schulung:Erfassen/Auszählen der 
Stimmzettel (1) 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 7 
Figure 16: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Seventh slide.
Schulung: Erfassen/Auszählen der 
Stimmzettel (2) 
Ausgewählte Partei 
QR-Code zur elektr. 
Auszählung 
Infobar: Beschreibung der Stimmenvergabe. 
Beschreibung der Wahl 
Liste der gestrichenen 
Kandidaten (nur aus 
der ausgewählte Partei) 
Kandidaten der  
“Grüne” Partei 
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote 8 
Direkt vergebene Stimmen 
Figure 17: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Eighth slide.
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Schulung: Erfassen/Auszählen der 
Stimmzettel (3) 
1.  Stimmzettel hinhalten 
2.  Orangen Angabe 
überprüfen 
1.  Name 
2.  Anzahl Kreuze 
3.  ID  
3.  Auf dem Stimmzettel 
durchgestrichenen 
Kandidaten überprüfen 
1.   ID & Name tauchen 
nicht an der 
entsprechenden Stelle 
auf 
4.  Bei Fehlern Stimmzettel 
separiert ablegen 
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Figure 18: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Ninth slide.
Aufgabenverteilung
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Figure 19: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Tenth slide.
Fragen?
§Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!
§Kurzer Test und dann… 
10 Min.
| Jurlind Budurushi | Schulung und Auszählung mit EasyVote11
Figure 20: Training for electoral offi-
cials: Eleventh slide.
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